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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
WAGE DISPARITY IN THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND 
INFORMATION QUALITY 
Does wage disparity, measured as the difference between highest and lowest paid 
workers, affect the quality of reported financial information? I collect accounting 
professional wage data from an international accounting and finance employment 
placement firm for the period of 1972 to 2017. I investigate to what degree wage disparity 
in corporate and public accounting has affected accounting information quality by testing 
predictions derived from equity theory and tournament theory. I find that vertical wage 
disparity within, as well as horizontal wage disparity between, corporate and public 
accounting is associated with measures of the relevance and reliability of accounting 
information. Specifically, pay disparity within corporate accounting is associated with a 
significant reduction in earnings persistence, in the earnings-returns relationship, in the 
accruals-cashflow relationship, and with higher levels of absolute abnormal accruals. In 
tests of pay disparity within the public accounting profession I find evidence of improved 
information quality associated with higher pay disparity. These findings are consistent with 
the different structures of employment and career advancement within the corporate and 
public accounting professions.  
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I. Introduction 
In this study, I investigate to what degree wage disparity in corporate and public 
accounting has affected accounting information quality. Public accounting is structured 
through absolute performance measures where employees who meet satisfactory 
performance metrics are promoted to the next employment level where corporate 
accounting is structured as a relative performance tournament in which advancement is not 
guaranteed. I utilize theses structural differences between employment in corporate and 
public accounting to test the predictions put forth in both tournament theory and equity 
theory. Specifically, how the nature of the performance and advancement as absolute or 
relative and the fair wage-effort hypotheses put forth in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) describe 
the potential effects of wage disparity on the production of accounting information.   
Prior research has shown that wage disparity reduces worker effort and that overall 
income inequality erodes social capital (Elgar & Aitken, 2011). Tournament theory, 
however, proposes that pay disparity is a natural outcome of competition for promotion 
and wages (Connelly, Tihanyi, Cook, & Gangloff, 2014). Considering contemporary 
research has found that auditor wage levels are associated with audit quality outcomes 
(Hoopes, Merkley, Pacelli, & Schroeder, 2018; Payne & Williamson, 2019) and that 
unexplainable portions of higher CEO pay disparity levels are associated with lower firm 
financial performance (Rouen, 2019) the effect of wage disparity on the production of 
accounting information is not clear and has important implications for the structure of 
compensation within the accounting profession. This study hopes to inform public 
accounting and corporate accounting managers and executives how the structure of 
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compensation and the perceived fairness of wages may affect accounting information 
quality. 
To investigate the relationship between wage trends in the accounting profession 
and accounting information quality I collect data from the Robert Half Salary Guide from 
1972 to 2017. Robert Half is an employment agency that recruits for and fills temporary, 
full-time, and executive positions within accounting and finance and issues a yearly report 
on wages based on their placement data and client surveys. I use this pay data to generate 
measures of wage disparity as a comparison between corporate and public accounting 
professionals, and measures of wage disparity within corporate and public accounting. 
Using these pay disparity measures I examine if pay disparity is associated with accounting 
information quality and if the potential fairness effects described in equity theory affect 
workers differently under the condition of relative performance tournaments or absolute 
performance evaluation as proxied by the corporate and public accounting labor markets. 
I regress four measures of information quality on these disparity measures. 
Information has two primary characteristics of quality; representational faithfulness and 
relevance (FASB, 2010).  I utilize two measures of the faithful representation of accounting 
information; the mapping of accruals to their related cashflows as measured in Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) and the absolute value of performance adjusted abnormal accruals as 
described in Kothari et. al., (2004). I consider these measures aspects of faithful 
representation because they capture the potential for bias and error within the accounting 
information system. I utilize two measures of relevance in my tests; earnings persistence 
and the market’s reaction to earnings information. Earnings persistence measures a key 
aspect of information quality and relevance, specifically that the information provides 
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predictive value. The market’s reaction to earnings information examine the feedback 
value of accounting information.  Both predictive and feedback value are characteristics of 
the relevance aspect of information quality and both earnings persistence and the market’s 
reaction to earnings information are long standing and common proxies for information 
quality. 
I find that higher levels of pay disparity within corporate accounting are associated 
with reduced accounting information quality, specifically, with lower earnings persistence, 
reduced relevance of earnings in explaining returns, higher unexplained variance in the 
accruals-cashflow relationship, and higher levels of absolute discretionary accruals. This 
finding suggests that wage disparity reduces fairness perceptions within the participants of 
a relative performance tournament. Further, I find that pay disparity within the public 
accounting labor market is associated with greater earnings persistence and lower 
unexplained variance in the accruals-cashflows relationship; suggesting that pay disparity 
does not decrease fairness perceptions and incentivizes effort under absolute performance 
evaluation. These findings are important to our understanding of how relative performance 
tournaments and absolute performance structures affect production outcomes in the real 
marketplace. 
Additionally, I find that the horizontal pay disparity ratio, which is the ratio of 
corporate accounting wages to public accounting wages and captures the effect of wage 
comparison between the two accounting employment markets, is associated with; lower 
variance in the accruals-cashflow relationship, lower levels of performance adjusted 
absolute discretionary accruals, and a higher levels of market response to earnings 
information. This suggests that when corporate accounting wages higher when compared 
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to public accounting wages either fairness perceptions within the relative performance 
tournament are increased and/or higher income potential from exiting public accounting 
and entering corporate accounting motivates auditors.  
These findings join a growing national conversation regarding pay disparity and 
income inequality. Income inequality has grown to a level unseen since the great 
depression (Kelleher, 2019; Zucman, 2019) and inequality in wages has been found to 
explain reduced worker effort in a cross section of macroeconomic productivity over 34 
OECD nations (Policardo & Carrera, 2018). Although wages have remained stagnate for 
much of the economy wile earnings at the top of the income distribution have been 
increasing (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2008), it is not known if corporate or public 
accounting employment has experienced similar wage trends. I report on the descriptive 
statistics of accounting profession wage levels and disparity levels since 1972 and find that 
although variation in disparity level exists, and top wages have seen a significant increase 
in the last 20 years, wages have also been increasing for all wage levels reported within 
corporate and public accounting over the same time period. I do not find similar wage 
stagnation, or an always increasing time trend in disparity level within the accounting 
profession. 
This investigation into wages and pay disparity over the last 45 years in the 
accounting profession, and its differential effect between corporate and public accounting, 
provides insights into a professional labor market that provides significant oversight to 
global financial markets and ensures accountability for most advanced economic activity. 
Wage stagnation and its contribution to growing levels of income and wealth inequality is 
becoming more contentious for policy makers, regulators, and employers with every 
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passing year. The accounting profession has long been viewed as a stable profession and a 
profession that affords a comfortable life to its members. It is important to understand how 
pay disparity in the accounting profession affects the production of accounting information 
so that employers, policy makers, and regulators may understand and manage the 
production of accounting information.  
II. Background 
Economic research in equity, fairness, and tournament theory  
To better understand equity theory and tournament theory research within 
economics I searched for a comprehensive literature review of research utilizing the ideas 
of tournament theory, equity theory, fairness, and / or reciprocity. Theories of equity and 
compensation in economics are often traced to the gift exchange model put forth in Akerlof 
(1982), which describes how labor contracts, when viewed as partial gift exchanges, both 
influence and are influenced by the workers’ social norms and perceptions. Tournament 
theory is grounded in the work of Lazear & Rosen (1981) who analytically describe how 
rank order tournaments would elicit the same effort response as piece rate performance 
evaluation whilst reducing monitoring costs on behalf of the principle. I reviewed four 
major econ journals (American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Journal of Political Economy, and the Journal of Labor Economics) for articles that 
expressly mentioned equity theory, tournaments, reciprocity, or fairness within their titles 
or abstracts published between the years 1980 and 2018.1  I reviewed these articles and 
                                                 
1 Being unable to find a comprehensive review of this literature published between 1980 and 2018 related 
to equity theory, fairness, or reciprocity, I focused on the inclusion of these articles. I was able to identify 
several reviews of tournament theory research. 
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eliminated those not directly related, yielded approximately 80 articles, the resulting 
relevant articles are included in Table 0; I have included a discussion of this research below. 
Early work in theories of equity and employment 
Early work within economics regarding equity theory as an explanation of wage 
levels and worker effort began as a way to explain unemployment. Traditional economic 
models of labor markets have difficulty explaining unemployment in an efficient market, 
since the supply-demand equilibrium should be market clearing. The work of Akerlof and 
others through the 1980s brings sociological theories of equity into the explanation of labor 
markets. The initial thrust of this work is to explain unemployment as a result of employers 
paying higher than market clearing wages, which results in extra effort provisioned by 
employees and therefore, leaves some labor supply unutilized. This is the concept put forth 
in Akerlof (1982). 
Published in the same year as the partial gift exchange model, Baumol (1982) 
discusses how the concept of fairness may be used by economists; citing a handful of 
papers that introduced the philosophical concept to the economics literature through the 
1960s and 70s, Baumol’s work is concerned with the practical application of fairness in 
the study of economic and public policy. Utilizing a commodity rationing setting, Baumol 
uses analytical procedures to show that fairness considerations may explain rationing 
outcomes that, that without such consideration, may be viewed as in-optimal or irrational 
and that these considerations allow researchers to approach policy issues related to equity 
that would otherwise me avoided by the application of traditional economics.  
In further discussion of the emerging literature, Akerlof (1984) discusses gift 
exchange and efficiency wages within four paradigms utilized in the economic research 
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literature to explain premiums paid above market clearing wages; the dual labor market 
hypothesis, Weberian theory of organizations, work groups; and equity theory. Akerlof 
presents these paradigms as natural and realistic explanations of the observable reality that 
buyers often pay higher than market clearing prices for labor. (Akerlof & Yellen, 1987) 
continues this discussion centered around the prospect that rational economics cannot 
intuitively explain the reality of both unemployment and efficiency wages by arguing that 
equity theories of labor provide the most natural explanation of wage premiums whilst 
remaining reconcilable to the other paradigms. 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) survey a sample of the general population 
to investigate how profitable, honest, and even expected actions in the market may be 
viewed as exploitive and unfair.  They find that an individual’s sense of entitlement 
affects market exchange outcomes and distorts equilibria unless the analysis includes 
fairness as a factor. Of particular interest is how cutting wages, or terminating employment 
in order to do so for new workers, under the condition of decreasing demand is viewed as 
unfair for currently employed workers (but not necessarily unfair when the current worker 
leaves voluntarily or when the employer fundamentally alters the nature of the business 
activity). Gorman and Kehr (1992) re-perform the survey used in  Kahneman et. al., 
1986, but survey business executives to understand if individuals in control of wage and 
pricing decisions shared the general sentiment of the populace regarding the fairness of 
wage and price level changes based on market conditions. Utilizing a sample of 320 CEOs, 
Gorman and Kehr (1992) ask the same fairness questions Kahneman et. al., 1986 and find 
that, although CEOs are more accepting of ‘unfair’ transactions, especially when protecting 
profits or passing costs to consumers, their overall directional fairness assessments are the 
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same as the general populace and that fairness norms affect the perceptions of wage and 
price changes.  
Research into fairness norms continues to question the view of workers as absolute 
rational actors and Akerlof and Yellen (1988) postulate an important human concept in 
wage determination, “hedonism seems too simplistic” (pg. 44). They show wage fairness 
perceptions are tied to the worker motivation beyond a hedonistic utility maximizing pay 
to effort model. Specifically, in scenarios where it is advantageous to pay some employees 
higher wages, it is fair to pay other employees higher wages as well. The fundamental 
observation that higher paid workers often ‘grumble and shirk’ while workers with lower 
pay are often ‘satisfied and hardworking’ is a motivating factor. Pointing out that the 
hedonistic forces of greed may hold well in an impersonal market trading economy but the 
closeness of contact in an employment setting brings the factors of fairness into effect. 
These models of fairness explain observed wage disparities between occupations and 
industries and mitigate the concern of traditional wage models that cannot explain 
unemployment within a utilitarian, fully maximizing hedonistic world. 
A formal model of the effect of fairness perceptions on the relationship between 
wages and effort is developed be Akerlof and Yellen (1990). This model describes how 
workers will proportionally withdraw effort when the wage provided falls short of their 
perception of a fair wage. This withdraw of effort can lead to a withdraw from employment 
and the pursuit of other options or opportunities and serve as a barrier to full employment 
as workers are reluctant to accept employment at wages below their fairness perceptions. 
An important factor in this model how workers adjust their expectations when faced with 
increasing wages; essentially, a wage increase beyond the fairness threshold adjusts the 
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worker’s fairness threshold; the implication of which explains that wage increases beyond 
the perceived fair wage cannot produce more than 100% effort over time.  Further, Akerlof 
and Yellen (1990) discuss how non-wage level factors can affect the perception of wage 
fairness; for example, higher levels of unemployment may lead workers to view their 
wages as fairer while poor working conditions cause them to view their wages as less fair, 
ceritus paribus.  
The Inclusion of Fairness and Reciprocity 
Rabin (1993) argues that extending a generalized ‘kindness function’ to economic 
models under complete or in-complete information is essential to applied economic 
research and formalizes a model of reciprocity and fairness. Basing this work in the prior 
equity and fairness research, Rabin (1993) incorporates their model of fairness and 
reciprocity into game theory, showing how fairness equilibrium exist as mutual min-max 
conditions when payoffs are small, but when payoffs are large, fairness equilibrium are a 
set of Nash equilibria. Due to the personal utility derived from fairness, when payoffs are 
smaller the overall utility level does not become as arbitrarily small as the payoff. A large 
payoff, on the other hand, generates a bias toward unfair equilibria through both a greater 
appeal to material self-interest and the fact that and increase in material self-interest may 
motivate an individual toward unfair actions when other parties are behaving fairly, but till 
not motivate the individual toward fair action when the other parties behave unfairly.  
Nelson (2001) goes further in a comment on Rabin (1993) describing the way in which, 
under the highest payoff scenarios,  fairness acts as a normal economic good; meaning, that 
as the marginal utility of another dollar declines, players will once again indulge in fairness 
behavior to increase personal utility.  
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Contemporary work regarding fairness norms in the practice of wage setting 
provides qualitative and quantitate evidence regarding the efficacy of fairness concerns in 
the establishment of wages.  Rees (1993) while recounting how little rational economics 
served them in their own roles as board member and presidential advisor, declares that the 
one factor of overwhelming importance to wage determination was fairness, and primarily, 
fairness derived from comparisons between groups and hierarchies. A particularly intuitive 
example is provided in which an employee receives pay on Friday and a raise on Monday, 
leading to an increased feeling of fairness until such time as they discover, on Tuesday, 
that others within their group received a higher raise. It is at this time, that their fairness 
utility may well be lower than it was on Friday, before any increase in wage was known of 
provided. It is in this way the effect of comparative wage fairness is more powerful than 
the wage itself. 
Levine (1993), examines real evidence of wage adjustments by corporate 
executives through a survey of 139 compensation executives. These compensation 
specialists are surveyed regarding wage adjustments in varying fairness contexts. Similar 
to the anecdotal evidence provided in Rees (1993); Levine (1993) finds that for 
professional compensation specialists considerations of equity are an important factor in 
managing a company’s internal wage structure in response to market forces. Specially, that 
within employment groups (those in similar jobs) fairness considerations reduced the 
compensation executives’ recommendations for wage increases to one employment 
category of the group over others. This effect was not apparent when considering the 
differential wage recommendations between jobs in different groups or hierarchical paths. 
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Meaning, fairness and equity considerations effect internal wage levels even to the point 
of detriment for employees.  
As researh utilizing equity theory advanced the concepts of fairness and reciprocity 
within the economic research literarture, Prasnikar & Roth (1992) address a growing debate 
concerning how game theory, when used as a descriptive theory of observable behavior 
must take fairness into account. They are primarily concerned with how several studies 
reach highly divergent predictions regarding the outcomes of similarly structured games; 
specifically, the way in which game structure may align both maximizing behavior and 
fairness, resulting in the appearance of one concern dominating the other when such an 
observation is the result of the endogenous aspects of common experimental games. They 
report the results of a sharp experimental test within this class of games and find that both 
traditional game-theoretic predictions and the effect of fairness considerations remain 
pertinent to behavioral predictions and experimental designs choices must attenuate to the 
need to disentangle these effects. Essentially, that concepts of fairness and reciprocity co-
exist with self-interest, and may at times be aligned. 
The Co-Existence of Fairness and Self-Interest 
 Bolton and Ockenfels  (2000) present a theory of equity, reciprocity, and 
competition that incorporates both narrow self-interest and relative standing to explain why 
isolated investigations of equity and reciprocity diverge in their findings. They find that 
the incorporation of relative payoff concerns (comparisons between groups and 
participants) explain how investigations of equity or reciprocity-based games find different 
results. The implication being that even when concerned with equity and reciprocity, 
fairness comparisons affect outcomes and observable behavior. This model is supported by 
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the interesting study Heinrich et. al. (2001) who examine cooperation, reciprocity and 
punishment across 15 tribal societies.  A cooperative work between economists and 
sociologists / anthropologists living within tribal societies, this field study investigates and 
finds that both fairness and personal interest co-exist within hunter-gather tribes. They find 
the argument that humans act in pure self-interest is not supported in any of the 
experimental outcomes and that fairness is a fundamental and universal aspect of human 
economic and interpersonal action. This notion holds true within in an environment where 
there is no punishment mechanism for shirking. Specifically, Hannan, Kagel, & Moser 
(2002) test the Akerlof gift exchange model and conduct experiments utilizing MBA and 
undergraduate students.  They find that participants do provide higher effort when wages 
are higher and there is no mechanism to punish shirking. Further, the participants level of 
work experience moderated this association and incrementally increase the amount of 
effort provided.  
Another interpretation, with similar implications, is put forth in Charness and Rabin 
(2002); they describe how pervasive and fundamental confounds within the experimental 
procedures used in prior studies give the impression that ‘social preferences’ for either 
utility maximization or comparative fairness may be a result the subjects concern for 
increasing overall social welfare. This arises due to study designs were personal 
maximization and reciprocity are confounded; i.e. when punishing you benefits me. They 
find that participants sacrifice value to increase overall welfare by increasing value 
distribution generally and to low-payoff participants specifically; and less so reduce their 
specific group and individual differences. Further, they find that participants are motivated 
by reciprocity to punish unfair behavior or to achieve a fair outcome.  
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The weight attached to factors beyond the individuals control in fairness 
considerations varies significantly based upon the different ‘ideal’ fairness paradigms a 
person may hold true (Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2007). Cappelen et. al. 
(2007) investigate the individual tradeoff between self-interest and egalitarianism when 
attaching weight to fairness concerns across different scenarios of distributive justice. In a 
one-shot dictator game where some factors of production outcomes are beyond the 
individuals’ control, they find a pluralism of fairness ideals that interact with the individual 
and group decisions between altruism and self-interest. They find that although distributive 
justice matters to all groups those who identify as strict egalitarian; liberal egalitarians’ and 
libertarians’ sense of distributive justice is affected by the other players endowment 
behavior. In all groups, there exists a certain amount of moral ‘wiggle room’ where players 
bias self-interest against distributional justice.  
Cappelen et. al. (2007) show that individuals with different ideal fairness paradigms 
react differently to the behavior of others in fairness related games. (Ho & Su, 2009) further 
this line of investigation to understand the extent to which fairness perceptions depend on 
an assessment of peer versus hierarchical endowment. Utilizing ultimatum game 
experiments where one follower interacts with a leader, and then a second follower, 
interacts with the same leader with variation in the knowledge of the first participants 
endowment, they find that, when there is a signal of the first follower’s payoff the second 
follower demonstrates behavior that indicates twice the level of preference for peer-
induced fairness beyond a preference for distributional fairness. This result suggests that 
peer wage comparisons will also affect effort provision beyond employer-employee or 
other forms of hierarchical income disparity. Goerg, Kube, & Zultan (2010) , however, 
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describe how different reward schemes and production technologies may affect effort 
provisioning within teams; specifically, that the interaction between fairness considerations 
and reward structures can have positive effects depending on the nature of the production 
function.  They find that unequal rewards increase coordination between recipients, and 
overall effort, when the workers inputs are designed as compliments and are not 
substitutable.  
These findings show how fairness considerations and self-interest are often both 
divergent and complimentary. In many cases, although self-interest is often narrowly 
defined within the individual’s preferences, fairness requires comparison between 
individual outcomes and self-interest expectations. Both what the worker wants for 
themselves, what they expect to get, and what they observe others receiving generates these 
perceptions. 
Efficiency Wages and Contextual Fairness: The power of comparison  
Contemporary to Rabin (1993), Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) utilize an 
experimental setting to investigate the role fairness may play in setting prices. Utilizing an 
oral auction where sellers determine the quality of the goods provided after buyers set 
prices, they find that sellers responded to prices substantially above the market-clearing 
level with higher levels of quality, supporting the fair wage-effort theory. In a similar vein, 
Fehr and Falk (1999) investigate if workers underbid wages and if employers take 
advantage of underbidding through four double-auction sessions with incomplete labor 
contracts and four with complete contracts. They find that, although workers will underbid 
wages, employers reject underbidding as it is costly if the worker has discretion over effort. 
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This finding implies that employers are aware of the relationship between wages and efforts 
and will attempt to avoid the shirking associated with unfair pay.  
The findings show that behavior differs between markets and bilateral negotiations, 
a difference that can be informative to how attribution fairness and reciprocity is assigned. 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose that a common principle explains differential behavior 
between markets and bilateral contract negotiations. Using analytical models with 
experiments including dictator and market games they show that distributional preferences 
are context dependent and based on the environment in which fairness is considered agents 
may be altruistic or selfish. This is an important consideration and insightful to our 
understanding that context is important to fairness norms and considerations. 
Another context issue in fairness considerations is the comparison of wages 
between groups and employees. Galizzi and Lang (1998) examine Italian Social Security 
records and find wage comparison between workers’ wages and the opportunity for future 
wage growth affect quit decisions for a sample of firms in Turin from 1981 to 1983. They 
find that workers consider their wages relative to other wages, in both short-term and long-
term models. However, an analysis of wage compression and decompression in Sweden 
does not find that fairness or morale were necessarily linked with the resulting aggregate 
productivity increase.  Hibbs and Locking (2000) who investigate a natural shock to wage 
compression in Sweden find that although interindustry wage compression obtained 
through centralized solidarity bargaining is associated with increased productivity, they do 
not find evidence that specific firm level wage compression increased productivity. These 
findings provide mixed evidence on context-based fairness-productivity affects.  
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A primary consideration of contextual fairness concerns relies on the mindset of 
the individuals making the fairness judgments. Konow (2000) investigates the roles of 
fairness, self-interest, and self- deception in the allocation of economic rewards and finds 
fairness concerns may be affected, mitigated, or amplified by the individual’s cognitive 
dissonance regarding distributional outcomes. Rejecting the notion of pure self-interest, 
Konow (2000) argues that by accepting the genuine value of fairness we can also 
incorporate the incentives that exist to for changing one’s belief about what constitutes 
fairness in any given situation. This allows for the entrance of both fairness and cognitive 
dissonance into a model that contains self-interest obtained by material utility. 
Incorporating the ways self-interest and fairness are reconcilable is an important step to 
addressing divergent results in wage disparity research.  
Other research shows some external wage pressures can have an overall effect on 
fairness perceptions, even when they are external to employer controls. (Falk, Fehr, & 
Zehnder, 2006) investigate how fairness perceptions are associated with reservation wages 
when dealing with minimum wage laws. They create an experimental marketplace where 
workers and employees are paired over multiple rounds and minimum wage laws are 
introduced and then removed from the contract setting. They find that the temporary 
introduction of a minimum wage moves employees reservation wages beyond the 
minimum level and this increase persists after the minimum requirement is removed.  
Employers increase wages after the introduction of the minimum to a level beyond the 
minimum required and do not utilize sub-minimum wages when the requirement is 
removed because they understand fairness perceptions will lead to shirking in those 
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circumstances. This external wage setting factor has fairness implications as a comparison 
point for employees and employers in evaluating fairness expectations.  
Intent and context have been shown to affect fairness perceptions and effort 
allocation across varying wage and compensation structures; (Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, 
& Tungodden, 2013) add risk taking to the list of contextual factors that affect fundamental 
fairness perceptions and behavioral norms. They find that most people focus on the 
perceivable risks ex-ante, meaning risk taking is a significant factor in their judgements of 
outcome fairness; however, people also prefer ex-post re-distribution, meaning that, 
although they recognize that risk taking behavior reduces the perceived unfairness of 
losses, they still prefer some form of redistribution that alleviates a portion of the risky 
behavior.  People do differ greatly in their re-distributional choices, preferring to 
redistribute gains and losses viewed to be derived from ‘luck’ to a significantly greater 
degree than those perceived to be a result of ‘choices.’ 
Another contextual factor in wage perceptions is the ability to determine wage 
increases ex-ante;  (Sliwka & Werner, 2017) investigate how the difference in the timing 
of wage increases, and whether or not the worker has knowledge of the distributional 
pattern affect effort provision. They find that an incremental and balanced distribution of 
wages across all periods provides an optimal result and attribute this to the perception that 
a generous wage level or increase will be  considered normal and expected in the next; a 
conclusion that supports the fair wage-effort hypothesis that paying wages at a level higher 
than the ‘fair wage’ will provide limited effort allocation beyond the fair wage as people 
have adaptive reference standards when determining their perception of a fair wage.  
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One of those adaptive reference standards, as described by the fair wage-effort 
hypothesis is wage comparisons between workers. (Dube, Giuliano, & Leonard, 2019) 
examine the impact that unequal raises between employees has on quit behavior. They 
collect 30 months of proprietary store level worker wage data from a large retail firm with 
over 700 stores. They find that quit behavior is associated with relative pay concerns, and 
that when workers of similar rank and function receive differential wage increases, those 
peer comparisons increase quit behavior. This finding supports the predictions of the fair 
wage-effort hypothesis that employees compare wages and utilize this peer comparison in 
their fairness determinations.  
Prior research in equity theory, fairness, and reciprocity has demonstrated that 
workers provide varying effort due to the varying utility effects of fairness and reciprocity 
considerations. At the core of this ideal is the fair wage-effort hypothesis that describes 
how workers will assess their wages in comparisons to the wages provided to others both 
within and across similar groups and within the hierarchy of pay levels. When workers 
perceive their wage as less fair, they will reduce effort allocation or otherwise suffer 
negative production and performance consequences. This motivation to punish unfair 
behavior is a foundation of the fair wage-effort hypothesis. Charness (2004) investigate to 
what degree variation in effort provision is associated with this reciprocity by examining 
differences in effort provisions when wages can be attributed to an employer, random 
assignment, or to an external party. They find that both concepts of distributional equity 
and reciprocity affect effort provision based on variation within both the wage levels and 
the attribution of wages. This implies that wage levels matter regardless of volition in 
attribution and that workers will also engage in reciprocity when volition can be attributed 
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to the employer. Generally speaking, the satisfaction of self-interest through higher pay co-
exists with the willingness to provide greater effort when this satisfaction comes from the 
employer.  
This consideration of expectations is important on the macro level, but is also 
applicable on a micro, sub-group level and can help us understand how fairness 
considerations apply beyond an individual level and how their effect can manifest within 
group dynamics. An interesting study in this area, (Mas, 2006), examines how pay raises 
that fail to meet a specific reference point considered fair by the employee group within a 
collective bargaining setting can reduce performance. They use data on final arbitration 
regarding police union wage requests to investigate if wage increases that fall below a 
perceived fair wage are associated with reduced performance. In this setting, the police 
union and the government submit their wage demand / offers to an arbitrator who is 
required to select one of the two offers. They find that when union wage requests are not 
met, several measures of performance decline, and this decline is associated with the level 
of difference between expected wage and actual wage. These findings support the fair 
wage-effort hypothesis and provide evidence that external attribution of wage levels does 
not mitigate the effect of fair wage perceptions on performance.  
Rank Order Tournaments vs Absolute Performance  
  Comparisons of outcomes in the context of fairness and distributional equity often 
rely on differential outcomes where measured performance may not differ; however, when 
if measured performance differs, the resulting effects of fairness may be mitigated.  
Tournament theory has been used as an explanation for the causes and outcomes of some 
forms of wage disparity; (Lazear & Rosen (1981) describe the potential differential 
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outcomes of compensation schemes based on rank order instead of output level. Utilizing 
analytical models of effort allocation, they show how rank-order compensation generates 
the same allocation as piece rate when workers are risk-neutral; but when workers are risk 
adverse, they will prefer one over the other depending on the shape of the utility function. 
Green & Stokey (1983) further investigate the idea of rank-order compensation by 
modeling how individual contracts in a setting with a risk-neutral principle and risk-
adverse agents allow the principle to filter the idiosyncratic effect of common shocks. They 
find that rank-order tournaments provide information regarding the amount of an agent’s 
output that is attributable to direct effort and not derived from general ‘shocks,’ information 
that assists the principle in establishing compensation without more costly direct 
monitoring. 
 Early work in tournament theory shows that incorporating elements from rank order 
tournaments into compensation schemes may increase efficient allocation while reducing 
monitoring costs. (Bull, Schotter, & Weigelt, 1987) present an experimental investigation 
of the fundamental tenants of tournament theory by examining if laboratory participants 
exhibit the behavior predicted in models of rank order tournaments. They utilize 
experiments where 225 undergraduates are paired and make cost / effort decisions subject 
to a random shock and find that mean effort levels for both piece-rate and rank-order 
tournaments converged toward expected equilibrium, however, rank-order schemes 
produced higher effort variance, and piece-rate compensation elicited higher effort from 
disadvantaged participants. These findings support the fundamental aspects of rank-order 
tournaments but also identify some potential unexpected affects associated with the use of 
rank order tournaments in compensation schemes. These unexpected effects of the rank-
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order or tournament style aspects of compensation schemes may help address the research 
question raised in (Bhattacharya & Guasch, 1988); paraphrased, ‘If tournament models are 
more efficient and less costly to monitor than piece-rate compensation schemes, why are 
rank-order tournaments not seen much in practice?’ Arguing that, since compensation 
schemes exist within individual firm hierarchies, compensation schemes differ from the 
modeled expectations and that comparisons across skill types and across different 
‘tournaments’ are necessary for efficient outcomes when ability-based self-selection 
occurs. This group-based comparison has other implications for the efficiency of 
tournament-based compensation schemes.  (Lazear, 1989) describes several different 
practical employment situations and finds that wage compression, meaning lower levels of 
wage disparity, can increase efficient allocation when compensation outcomes is based on 
relative comparisons within groups. 
To further explain the high variation in effort allocation identified in Bull et. al., 
1987 (Drago & Heywood, 1989) take a closer look at the potential unexpected effects of 
compensation-based tournament structures. Specifically, they examine the possible causes 
of the high variance in effort allocation reported under the rank-order tournament 
condition. They replicate and extend the prior experimental procedures utilizing different 
incentive structures.  Their findings do not support the explanation offered in Bull et. al., 
1987 that computational difficulties within the tournament experiment explain high 
variance in effort allocation; they find that the variance is explained by motivation and 
strategic action in relation to incentive structure. The implications of this finding are that 
tournament-based incentive structures introduce a strategic factor on the part of the worker 
into the compensation-effort allocation decision.  
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Main, O'Reilly, & Wade (1993) introduce tournament theory as a challenge to 
equity considerations within the pay of top management teams. Citing Lazear & Rosen 
(1981) who describe how rank-based pay and output based pay are equally efficient when 
workers are risk neutral, Main et. al., (1993) suggest that the compensation of top 
executives exceeding the product of their labor may be an economically efficient outcome 
due to the motivational effect of higher top management pay on employees down the ladder 
who hope to access that pay level in the future. They investigate the effects of pay 
dispersion within a firm’s top management team in a five-year sample of over 2000 
executives per year.  This analysis of executive compensation shows that top management 
team pay appears to follow a sequential tournament structure where increasing rank-based 
awards motivate employees and equity concerns are secondary. These findings are 
interesting when considering the functions presented by Rabin (1993) and how payoff 
levels may affect the utility of fairness considerations.  
Tournament Structures and Disparate Outcomes 
Eriksson (1999) provides initial evidence that pay dispersion within the executive 
structure is associated with higher levels of performance in a regression analysis of 2600 
executives from 210 firms over 4 years . This finding is interesting in the context of 
group-based dynamics of pay disparity as the defined group are executive level employees. 
They find that in some instances larger pay disparity among executives is associated with 
higher performance, but these results are not apparent when the executive team is more 
interdependent. Bognanno (2001) provide further examinations of the structure of 
executive compensation within the firm and find there are several ways in which 
tournament theory practically describes the current employment and career advancement 
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within the corporate firm. Bognanno performs an analysis of personal and job 
characteristics for 25,000 managers and executives per year from 1981 to 1988 and finds 
that a tournament environment with promotion incentives seems to characterize the 
structure of corporations; however, the high predictability of who receives the CEO 
promotion based on their current pay suggest there is no tournament, or the tournament is 
already concluded at that stage. 
Fairness, Selection, and Worker Perceptions of Potential Outcomes   
This issue of tournament stages, or more importantly, how players are sorted into 
tournament groups has implications for the outcomes of tournament-based compensation 
schemes. Fullerton & McAfee (1999) describe how utilizing an auction process for 
tournament entry allows potential participants to self-select into the tournament utilizing 
their own private information. This generates a tournament with lower monitoring costs 
and higher effort allocation as the restricted number of participants are able to better gauge 
the outcome of their effort allocation and reduces their perception of risk. Now, the ability 
to gauge outcomes within a tournament setting has significant impacts on effort allocation; 
for example, Levy & Vukina (2004) investigate the differential effect of tournament vs. 
piece-rate pay when participants have different ability and performance levels and find that 
a ‘league effect’ exists.   Through an archival analysis of broiler chicken contracts from 
both piece-rate and tournament-based compensation schemes they find that when 
participants of unequal ability participate in multi-round tournaments against the same 
players this creates a ‘league effect’, altering the expectations of the players and making 
piece rate more efficient as players with no expectation of victory underperform in the 
tournament setting, and surprisingly, so do those who naturally expect to win.  
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Self-selection into tournament groups may explain much of the observed efficiency 
effects of tournament-based compensation structures. (Leuven, Oosterbeek, Sonnemans, 
& Klaauw, 2011) investigate the degree to which self-selection explains the observed 
performance outcomes of tournaments with different prize levels. They conduct a field 
experiment where students select into prize categories for performance levels and find 
that self-selection in tournaments gives the impression of higher rewards leading to higher 
performance, but that higher performing students sort into higher prize level games, and 
therefore, controlling for sorting the effect of tournament prize level is not apparent.  
Another issue within the structure of tournament-based compensation structures is 
the issue of sabotage, (Carpenter, Matthews, & Schirm, 2010) investigate how sabotage 
behavior manifests itself within a real effort experimental tournament with student 
participants. They find that when there is ambiguity in the assessment of the performance 
of a competitor, a worker will engage in sabotage behavior. They create an experiment 
where the participants where responsible for the count and evaluation of the performance 
of their contest rivals; and in some conditions, compensation was directly affected by these 
evaluations and counts. Not only did workers engage in sabotage behavior when they could 
influence the payoffs of their rivals; the very expectation of sabotage within the tournament 
setting reduced motivation and effort allocation.  In this case, the expectation of sabotage 
becomes an environmental factor that is increasing with tournament prize levels and 
decreases the efficiency of tournaments as compensation schemes.  
 The internal structure of promotion when the firm operates in a tournament setting 
is another factor in the efficient implementation of tournaments as compensation schemes. 
(Altmann, Falk, & Wibral (2012) investigate the potential effects of promotion on effort 
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and competitive behavior within a tournament setting by comparing behavior between a 
single stage and two stage elimination-based tournament. They find that participants exert 
effort beyond the expected equilibrium level in the first stage of a two-stage elimination 
game than they exert in the single stage game; their findings indicate this is likely due to 
forward looking behavior. Another consideration on how the structure of promotion will 
affect effort allocation based in tournament theory is the shape of the reward curve. 
Delfgaauw, Dur, Non, and Verbeke (2015) examine how convex variation in prize structure 
and ‘noise’ based uncertainty effects performance in a multi-stage setting. They conduct a 
field study within a retail chain by implementing a two-stage elimination tournament across 
208 locations. They find that workers with stable levels of performance significantly 
increase effort in response to convex prize structure; however, workers with volatile, less 
predictable performance do not. This finding supports the interpretation of prior that 
employees can identify their likelihood of advancing to the next stage and will adjust effort 
accordingly. It is important to note that although performance in the second round 
improves, it appears to do so at a cost to first round performance. 
 The fact workers can identify and incorporate tournament outcome expectations 
into their effort allocation decisions does not come as a surprise; however, it has significant 
implications for understanding effort provision within tournament structures. Workers 
want to be able to signal their quality within the tournament and employers hope to utilize 
a tournament structure to identify, reward, and retain high performing workers. Gürtler & 
Gürtler (2015) describe the information benefit derived by firms when heterogenous 
employees compete in a tournament setting and how this incentivizes firms to hire 
heterogenous employees. Utilizing analytical models of the outcomes of tournaments when 
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participants are homogenous vs. heterogenous they find that in a labor market with 
homogenous workers, heterogeneous workers have an incentive to outperform other 
workers and signal their quality to firms; this scenario incentivizes heterogenous workers 
to provide higher effort and incentivizes firms to select these workers for retention and 
reward. 
 Early work in tournament theory research describes the implications of rank-order 
tournaments as compensation schemes as motivating employees as efficiently as piece rate 
compensation while providing lower monitoring costs. However, research also shows that 
fairness perceptions within the tournament structure matter and prior findings support the 
comparison of regular career advancement and promotion and the likelihood of winning 
within rank order tournaments. This application of tournament theory to the real labor 
market also implies that group dynamics, cross group comparisons, and issues related to 
sub-optimal effort allocation and sabotage are real threats to the ability of compensation 
schemes that incorporate aspects of rank ordered tournaments to achieve an efficient pay-
effort equilibrium. Importantly, we see that tournament theory and equity theory are not 
incompatible, but may co-exist just as self-interest and fairness co-exists within the cultural 
and economic expectations of the worker. 
III. Hypothesis Development 
John C. Bogle, Founder of the Vanguard Group, in a speech to the PCAOB in 2017, 
described how the “rachet effect” of ever-increasing pay disparity at the executive level 
creates a self-perpetuating cycle as compensation is determined by comparison to peer 
compensation and not performance (Bogle, 2017). Although wealth and income inequality 
have been described by significant policy makers as the “defining challenge of our time” 
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(Parnass, 2013) and have attracted media attention for decades little research exists 
examining how wage disparity produces the production and communication of financial 
information. Wage disparity has been growing steadily since the early 80s, and although 
research in economics has found that wage disparity has remained stagnate since the mid-
90s for below median income levels, the difference between median income levels and the 
top 10% of income has steadily increased (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2008). One source of 
wage disparity often cited by the press, policy makers, and interests’ groups are the 
increasing levels of CEO compensation; in the 1950s the average CEO to employee wage 
ratio was 20:1, in 2017 that ratio was 347:1 (AFL-CIO, 2017). These increasing trends in 
general income inequality, and in the relationship between CEO and employee pay have 
served as motivation for financial regulations; for example, CEO to employee pay ratio 
disclosure rules included in the Dodd-Frank Act. This rule, implemented by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) requires the disclosure of the ratio of CEO to median 
employee compensation beginning in 2017 and is meant to provide shareholders with 
information to evaluate CEO pay (SEC, 2015).   
Bogle also recognizes the importance of the accountant’s role in providing 
oversight and accountability in this system. Specifically, Bogle calls for greater 
independence for the accounting function, higher levels of public accounting disclosures 
around significant issues, and greater oversight regarding non-GAAP measurements 
(Bogle, 2017). What is not addressed in the speech, or in prior research regarding wage 
disparity and accounting information quality, is if the accounting function suffers from 
similar wage disparity and if this disparity itself has a significant impact on accounting 
information quality. While rightfully concerned with growing disparity in the pay of the 
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CEO, however, the implications of similar affects and trends within the corporate 
governance environment could have further implications for shareholder interest, 
economic stability, and the public trust of the accounting profession.  
Although the increasing pay disparity of the CEO receives the greatest attention; 
wage disparity matters across professions, services, and positions. For example, Policardo 
& Carrera (2018) examine the how wage inequality affects productivity and find that 
inequality in wages explains reduced worker effort in a cross section of macroeconomic 
productivity over 34 OECD nations utilizing an Arellano-Bond GMM estimator to identify 
the effect of wage inequality as expressed by a national Gini index coefficient. The effect 
of pay disparity within the accounting profession is its own unique and interesting 
phenomenon. Accountants have different incentive structures and professional codes of 
ethics than other professions and other corporate managers. For example, prior research 
shows that CEOs with an accounting background demonstrate significantly different 
disclosure behavior than other CEOs, including with greater precision and less bias 
(Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010) and that accountant CFOs are more risk adverse (Hoitash, 
Hoitash, & Kurt, 2016). It is not known if accountants as members of a highly paid and 
respected profession experience the effects of pay disparity at all, and if so, does pay 
disparity represent an issue of fair wage perceptions or as motivation within a sequential 
tournament.  
Prior Research in Pay Disparity 
Prior research has shown pay disparity demonstrates mixed results when measuring 
outcomes for both workers and firms (Heyman, 2005; Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, 
Gamache, & Devers, 2016). Pay disparity, a term often a term used interchangeably with 
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pay dispersion or wage inequality, represents the degree of pay differences either between 
similar functions in different roles or vertical pay differences within the same production 
function (Connelly et. al., 2016; Devers et. al., 2007).  Pay disparity may increase 
individual motivation which increases firm performance, an effect predicted through 
tournament theory, or it may decrease effort and lead to lower productivity, higher 
employee turnover, and a loss of institutional knowledge, and for these reasons developing 
stronger contextual and institutional understandings of the differential effects of pay 
disparity of particular concern to business scholars (Devers et. al., 2007).  For this 
investigation I utilize both the horizontal and vertical measures of pay disparity within two 
major classes of employment within the accounting profession: corporate accounting and 
public accounting.  
Prior accounting research has hinted at the importance of fair wage perceptions 
within accounting labor markets and productivity functions. Persellin, Schmidt, & Wilkins 
(2014) survey 700 auditors and report that when auditors are required to work beyond the 
level that they believe audit quality suffers that this perception reduces their satisfaction 
with auditing as a profession. Further, in 2012, PCAOB board member Jay Hanson 
communicated that this reality of dissatisfaction with employment causes the best and 
brightest auditors to leave the profession (Hanson, 2012). One driver of job satisfaction is 
the perception of a fair wage, Hoopes et al (2018) find that higher salaries have a positive 
effect on audit quality, implying that higher salaries, or in the word of Akerlof and Yellen 
(1990), a wage perceived to be more fair, is associated with increase audit quality. These 
findings, however, do not represent a direct test of the fair wage-effort hypothesis and its 
potential effects on overall financial information quality. Hoopes et al., (2018) cite 
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anecdotal evidence that wages in the auditing profession have been stagnate over time 
whilst workloads and required hours have increased as motivation for their hypothesis that 
higher wages lead to higher quality. They investigate office level variation in pay and office 
level audit quality from 2004 to 2013 and find that offices that pay auditors more achieve 
better audit outcomes. This work, however, does not investigate the potential role of pay 
disparity in these outcomes.   
In an experimental setting, Guo, Libby, & Liu (2017) investigate the effect of 
vertical pay dispersion in a budgeting setting and find a wage disparity effect on both 
lower-ranked and higher-ranked employees. Consistent with the fair wage-effort 
hypothesis and equity theory, they find that subordinate employees are more likely to 
misreport costs when pay disparity is high; further, they find that when pay disparity is 
high, that supervisors are more lenient towards their subordinates due to the supervisor’s 
sensitivity to fairness perceptions. This evidence supports another channel through which 
pay disparity may introduce error or incomplete information into financial accounting 
process. 
Hannan (2005) invokes Akerlof’s (1982) gift exchange model and investigates the 
moderating relationship of firm profit on the association between higher wages and 
increased effort. Hannan reports that increasing wages leads to increased effort and notes 
that this result is explained by reciprocity as described in Rabin (1993). However, when a 
firm does not increase wages under the condition of a firm profit increase, workers ‘punish’ 
the employer by reducing effort; as predicted by the fair wage-effort hypothesis; further, 
reciprocity would predict that employees should also act altruistically, however, Hannan 
(2005) reports that employees punish firms that lower wages in the condition of a profit 
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reduction. The final condition, steady wages under the condition of profit reduction 
produces the expected reciprocity effect, employees perform better for the same wage.  
This finding can be explained through reciprocity; but when taken together with the 
unexpected penalty to wage reduction under the condition of profit reduction, we see 
another possibility arise. Now, reciprocity is a related construct to fairness, and both 
provide foundations for the fair-wage effort hypothesis; but here, we see employees 
reacting by increasing effort when they see their own wage as more fair under the condition 
of steady wage and reduced profit. When the firm reduces their wage, for any reason, 
employees will perceive their wage as less fair, regardless of reciprocity or justification for 
the wage decrease, and they will reduce. Now this may seem like a light distinction, but it 
is certainly an important one with strong implications for pay structures in labor markets 
which are subject to the fair-wage effort hypothesis.  
These nuanced differences between reciprocity and fairness allow me to investigate 
the effect of wage trends over time. A rational labor market would expect that wages, as a 
price equilibrium should be a function of the supply and demand for labor and that quality 
should not vary based on the price of labor, but the price of labor should vary based on the 
demand for quality. Tournament theory describes how increasing demands for effort 
should increase quality and wage disparity by requiring more wage disparity in later rounds 
of the ‘sequential tournament’ that career advancement through hierarchical organizations 
represents. In contrast, equity theory generally, and the fair-wage effort hypothesis 
specifically, predict that increasing wage disparity will reduce the worker’s perception of 
the fairness of their wage, and they will respond through a reduction in effort and 
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information transfer.  I believe that these effects will be discernable and testable in my 
investigation of pay disparity and accounting information quality.  
Equity Theory and Tournament Theory 
Tournament theory describes how competition for higher prizes based on 
performance level encourages effort and quality in work and generally argues that pay 
disparity promotes competition and provides positive incentives and promotes 
performance improvement (Connelly, Tihanyi, Cook, & Gangloff, 2014; Lazear & Rosen, 
1981). Tournament theory is proposed to explain pay disparity in that employees compete 
against one another for promotions and pay, the winner of this competition advances to a 
higher position with better pay, and due to resource constraints, this imposes pay 
constraints on those who did not advance; in this way compensation policies resemble a 
tournament (Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers, 2016). These prize 
structures are commonly used to explain large variation in executive compensation and are 
focused primarily on how this disparity affects firm performance, employee or CEO 
turnover, or firm governance (Connelly, Tihanyi, Cook, & Gangloff, 2014). Generally, 
tournament theory views pay disparity as a natural consequence of motivating individuals 
to perform across multiple sequential contests with the largest disparity required in the final 
round of promotion to ensure continued performance. 
Equity based theories of compensation generally rely on the idea of fairness and 
that when workers perceive their wages are not fair, they punish their employer through 
reduced effort and information transfer. As Akerlof and Yellen (1990, p. 256) states, “The 
motivation for the fair wage-effort hypothesis is a simple observation concerning human 
behavior: when people do not get what they deserve, they try to get even.” Rabin (1993, p. 
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1281) describes the relationship between perception and action in a deeper way, essentially 
that it is the same drive for positive reciprocity that leads to negative reciprocity, “the same 
people who are altruistic to other altruistic people are also motivated to hurt those who hurt 
them.” These theories are dependent on the workers perception of fairness in that their 
subjective assessments of their compensation and position may create dissonance that leads 
to a reduction in effort and information transfer, or the vacation of their position 
(Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, & Sanders, 2010) and several prior studies support this view 
(Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers, 2016). 
Utilizing CEO based measures of pay disparity, Rouen (2017) examines pay 
disparity ratios between CEOs and median firm employees utilizing a confidential data set 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2006 to 2013. Rouen (2017) finds that, adjusting 
the pay disparity ratios to correct for industry factors and economic performance, firms 
with higher CEO-employee pay disparity see reduced performance. Specifically that the 
portion of pay disparity that is not explained by economic performance is negatively 
associated with future return on assets and that this effect is increasing with lower quality 
corporate governance and higher employee turnover.2 This investigation supports the idea 
that pay disparity has contextually and market based differential effects on performance 
and quality.   
Wages, Productivity, and Tournament Theory 
Tournament theory describes how competition for higher prizes based on 
performance level encourages effort and quality in work and generally argues that pay 
                                                 
2 Although, Rouen (2017) acknowledges the fair wage perception effects exist across similar job 
comparisons (horizontal disparity), between different wage levels/positions (vertical disparity), and with 
variation in pay between all employees (overall disparity), the study focuses fully on vertical disparity 
between the CEO and the median employee. 
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disparity promotes competition, provides positive incentives and promotes performance 
improvement (Connelly, Tihanyi, Cook, & Gangloff, 2014). Tournament theory is 
proposed to explain pay disparity in that employees compete against one another for 
promotions and pay, the winner of this competition advances to a higher position with 
better pay, and due to resource constraints, this imposes pay constraints on those who did 
not advance; in this way compensation policies resemble a tournament (Connelly, Haynes, 
Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers, 2016).  These prize structures are commonly used to explain 
large variation in executive compensation. 
The two foundational predictions of tournament theory are that (1) the workers 
investment (i.e. effort or outputs) is fundamentally derived from their perception of how 
that investment affects the probability of them winning and (2) it is not the overall level of 
prize won, but the difference between winning and losing that is important; or stated 
analytically and described in Connelly et. al., 2014: 
(1) 
𝜕𝑃 
𝜕𝜇
 (W1 – W2) = V 
Where equation 1 represents an equilibrium where at point V the marginal cost and 
marginal value of investment in the tournament are equal. In this model, the probability of 
winning the tournament (P) changes with the change in investment (μ). Therefore, the 
driving factor in this model at the point of equilibrium is the difference between the 
winning prize (W1) and the non-winning prize (W2). In this model, an increase in the 
disparity between the two prizes increases the marginal value of investment (V), and 
therefore, the willingness of the participant to increase their marginal cost. Extending this 
model to sequential tournaments creates a need for increasing differentials as risk adverse 
participants require greater incentives for motivation to ‘climb higher’ and not ‘rest on the 
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laurels’ of their prior accomplishments (Rosen, 1986). This predicts a higher level of pay 
disparity is required to motivate employees, especially employees in the final round of the 
tournament where there is no incentive for increased risk behavior beyond the final round. 
Faleye, Reis, & Venkateswaran (2013) utilize voluntarily reported CEO-employee 
pay ratios from 1993 to 2006 and investigate the determinants and outcomes of pay 
disparity and find that firm size, operational performance, stock returns, and risk are all 
associated with increased pay disparity. Further, supporting a tournament theory approach, 
they find a positive association between pay disparity and performance, measured as 
revenue per employee, that is more pronounced when promotions are merit based. 
Tournament theory studies imply that higher levels of income inequality may drive 
employees to perform better when they view those higher levels of pay as achievable 
outcomes; however, in a tournament structure CEOs would no longer have an incentive to 
compete if there are no more future prizes (promotions) but are motivated by the stark 
difference between winning and losing at that level (i.e. CEO vs non-CEO pay) that the 
tournament behaves as though there are never ending levels (Fredrickson, Davis-Blake, & 
Sanders, 2010). 
Wages, Productivity, and the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis 
Traditional economic models of a perfectly competitive labor market describe how 
wages are determined by the productivity of labor; therefore, in this equilibrium, an 
increase in productivity should increase demand leading to an increase in wages.  In this 
model, disparity in wages represents the marginal contribution of different wage levels to 
the final productive output of the firm. However, contemporary theoretical models suggest 
that the causal relationship may be inverted, meaning that higher wages increase effort and 
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productivity, where lower wages cause workers to shirk or otherwise penalize management 
and owners through reduced effort and increased information asymmetry (Akerlof 1982; 
Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Rabin 1993). The contemporary models are of interest here, as 
they provide a more informed and nuanced representation of a modern labor market. 
Equity based theories of compensation generally rely on the idea of fairness and 
that when workers perceive their wages are not fair, they punish their employer through 
reduced effort and information transfer. As Akerlof and Yellen (1990, p. 256) states, “The 
motivation for the fair wage-effort hypothesis is a simple observation concerning human 
behavior: when people do not get what they deserve, they try to get even.” Rabin (1993, p. 
1281) describes the relationship between perception and action in a deeper way, essentially 
that it is the same drive for positive reciprocity that leads to negative reciprocity, “the same 
people who are altruistic to other altruistic people are also motivated to hurt those who hurt 
them.” These theories are dependent on the workers perception of fairness in that their 
subjective assessments of their compensation and position may create dissonance that leads 
to a reduction in effort, information transfer, or the vacation of their position (Fredrickson, 
Davis-Blake, & Sanders, 2010) and several prior studies support this view (Connelly, 
Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers, 2016). 
This investigation is concerned with the effects of long run wage stagnation on 
productivity within a professional service setting. Specifically, this study investigates how 
wages, and the fair wage perception affect financial information quality.  Long run wage 
stagnation is an issue that is gaining attention as wealth inequality grows and as a consumer 
driven economy finds itself saddled with sluggish growth during a post crisis recovery 
period. This trend could have a significant effect on fair wage perceptions as described in 
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Akerlof and Yellen (1990). The fair wage-effort hypothesis states that workers perceive a 
fair wage level and adjust their effort accordingly, or stated analytically and described in 
Akerlof and Yellen, (1990): 
(2) e = min (w/w*,1) 
Where e represents the workers effort and w represents the workers wage. In this 
model, the workers wage is scaled by the workers perceived fair wage represented by w*.  
This model describes how the worker minimizes their effort based upon the relationship 
between their actual wage and their perceived wage where full normal effort is equal to 
one. This hypothesis describes a fundamental tenant of human existence often omitted in 
the consideration of rational economic behavior; specifically, as described in Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990 pg. 256): “…when people do not get what they deserve, they try to get even.” 
This realization of the economic behavior of workers represents a significant advance in 
our understanding of how efficiency wages affect productivity (Stiglitz, 2002). Essentially, 
as the real wage w decreases worker effort is adjusted by the scale difference between the 
real wage and workers perceived fair wage w*. 
Gatcher and Thoni (2009) execute three experimental studies to investigate how 
wage comparisons between employees impact productivity and find evidence consistent 
with Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) fair wage-effort hypothesis that a wage-disadvantaged 
worker provides lower effort and a wage-advantaged worker does not. They also find that 
on an individual level, these reactions to wage discrimination can be attributed to the 
perceived intent to discriminate and not to the payoff outcome. Cohn, Fehr, & Goette, 
(2015) perform a field experiment to investigate the role of fairness perceptions and find 
that workers who perceive being underpaid prior to an increase in wages increase their 
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effort while workers who do not perceive being underpaid do not increase effort in response 
to increased wages. Consistent with the fair wage effort hypothesis, the effect of increasing 
wages is due to a reduction in perceived unfairness and not due to a positive effect of 
reciprocity. The findings of Cohn et. al., 2015 are important in that they offer some initial, 
however limited, evidence supporting the fair wage-effort hypothesis in a field experiment 
and how this may reconcile divergent findings regarding wages, fairness, reciprocity, and 
effort. 
Accounting Wage Disparity and Accounting Information Quality 
The quality of accounting disclosures is clearly important to financial markets; as 
a society we have built institutions for the sole purpose of monitoring the quality of 
financial reporting. For these reasons, a significant portion of accounting research is 
focused on defining, measuring, and investigating variation within the financial reporting 
of accounting information. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 (FASB, 
2010) defines quality financial accounting information as possessing both relevance and 
representational faithfulness. Relevance refers to the ability of accounting information to 
make a difference in the decisions made by the information users; specifically, this refers 
to the predictive value and confirmation value of the information. Representational 
faithfulness is a more difficult construct to measure, but information considered to provide 
faithful representation is at least complete, neutral, and free from error. I examine the 
relevance and representational faithfulness as aspects of the quality of accounting 
information. 
To measure relevance, I examine the predictive value of accounting information 
through earnings persistence which represents the ability of current earnings to predict 
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future earnings, and I examine the confirmation value of accounting information by 
investigating the earnings-returns relationship which represents the market’s assessment of 
how well earnings information captures the economic reality of the firm. To examine 
representational faithfulness I rely on the absolute value of discretionary accruals as an 
inverse measure of neutrality, as higher levels of discretionary accruals increase the 
likelihood and magnitude of management bias within the accounting information system, 
and I utilize the quality of the accruals-cashflow relationship as a measure of the 
information being free from error, as greater unexplained variance in the accruals-cashflow 
relationship is an indicator of greater error within the accounting information system. 
Together, all these measures and concepts are components of what the accounting research 
literature refers to as earnings quality; specifically, that “higher quality earnings provide 
more information about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to 
a specific decision made by a specific decision-maker” (Dechow et. al., 2010, p. 344) and 
is often measured as the investors’ response to earnings.  
All measures of earnings quality are composed of the economic process of 
generating earnings and the ability of the accounting process to measure and report 
earnings. This process is not perfect, and as accountants, it is important for us to understand 
how and why error enters this process. As accountants the legitimacy of finical reporting 
and the quality of accounting information is the primary measure of the value of our 
profession within the capital marketplace. Prior research has shown that measurement error 
within the accounting system decreases the predictive and feedback value of earnings 
information and decreases the ability of investors to reliably estimate future changes in the 
firm’s financial position (Bratten, Causholli, & Khan, 2016; Bratten, Jennings, & Schwab., 
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2016). This paper focuses primarily on the measurable properties of earnings, as these 
properties are the most direct result of the accounting production function. I argue that a 
fundamental and significant factor affecting the quality of earnings through the accounting 
process is the effect that corporate accounting wages have on the outcome of the quality of 
accounting information.  
  Gaynor, Kelton, Mercer, & Yohn (2016) describe the process through which public 
financial reports are generated and classify determinants of financial reporting quality 
utilizing the judgment and decision-making frame work presented in Bonner, 2008, which 
categorizes the causes of quality variation into person factors, task factors, and 
environmental factors. One primary factor within the accounting production function is the 
motivation of the corporate accountants who gather, process, and report the underlying 
financial information and the public accountants who review and assure this information. 
Corporate accountants are an often over-looked component of the production of financial 
information within the academic research literature and few studies, beyond studies of 
characteristics of the CFO, attempt to investigate and explain how this component of the 
production function affects earnings quality outcomes and a better understanding of these 
components is needed within the accounting literature (Gaynor et. al., 2016; Dechow et. 
al., 2010; Gaver & Paterson, 2001). As a primary input to the production of accounting 
information, I argue that the motivation and effort of corporate accounting and public 
accounting professionals will be measurable through an examination of pay disparity 
between and within these groups and will have an observable effect on accounting 
information quality. 
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According to the fair wage-effort hypothesis, workers will penalize employers and 
owners through reduced effort and information transfer when they perceive their wages to 
be less fair (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Rabin, 1993; Akerlof, 2002). If this hypothesis holds 
within the accounting profession, the association between wage disparity and reduced 
effort should be detectable in measures of accounting information quality. This reduced 
level of effort and reduction in information transfer will result in greater variability within 
the accruals-cashflow relationship as measurement error due to incomplete information 
entering into the accounting system. Further, higher levels of discretionary accruals will be 
utilized as employees in the accounting function exert discretion over accrual levels to 
reduce the effort needed to reconcile accounting irregularities. These factors will reduce 
the reliability and representational faithfulness of the reported accounting information. 
Although equity theory predicts that reduced quality of accounting information is 
associated with pay disparity, tournament theory predicts that higher levels of pay disparity 
will motivate employees, increasing effort and quality. Therefore, if accounting 
professionals view their employment as a series of sequential contests, they will be 
motivated to improve the quality of accounting information, which should increase its 
predictive and confirmation value while reducing error and bias. I argue that, due to the 
differential structures of employment within corporate and public accounting, wage 
disparity within corporate accounting will be generally associated with reduced 
information quality. Further, due to the structure of public accounting employment, I 
suggest that higher wage disparity in public accounting will be generally associated with 
higher levels of information quality. When considering the differential between the two, a 
higher ratio of corporate-to-public accounting wage disparity would motivate workers 
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within the public accounting employment structure who view their ability to access higher 
wages within the corporate accounting employment structure upon their exit from public 
accounting should increase motivation and be associated with higher information quality. 
The predictions above are supported by theory; however, due to the nature of this 
investigation and without significant archival evidence to establish strong prior 
assessments within this environment I propose my hypothesis in the null form and 
recognize the lack of significant prior research within the accounting field to support my 
directional expectations. I investigate the association between pay disparity in both 
corporate and public accounting and the quality of accounting information across four 
distinct measures of earnings quality associated with the FASB definition of accounting 
information quality.  
Stated formally: 
 
H1: Higher levels of pay disparity between the highest and lowest paid corporate 
accounting positions will not be associated with accounting information quality 
 
H2: Higher levels of pay disparity between the highest and lowest paid public 
accounting positions will not be associated with accounting information quality 
 
H3: Higher levels of pay disparity between average corporate and average public 
accounting wages will not be associated with accounting information quality 
  
IV. Data and Methodology 
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Accounting Quality:  The accruals-cashflows relationship 
First, I examine two measures of the reliability and representational faithfulness of 
accounting information; the accruals-cashflows relationship and the absolute value of 
abnormal discretionary accruals. To assess the accruals-cashflow relationship, I utilize the 
accounting quality (AQ) model developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) which measures 
how the assumptions and estimates that underlie the creation of accruals lead to errors that 
must be corrected in future periods. When considering accruals related to the nature and 
timing of cashflows it is possible to examine the potential measurement error derived by 
changes in effort within the accounting information production function by utilizing the 
error in this relationship. Specifically, in how future and prior period cashflows fail to 
explain the expected mismatched relationship between current period accruals and current 
period cashflows. Stated formally as described in Dechow and Dichev (2002);  
𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑡 +𝜀𝑡 
(3) 
In this model, the error term of the regression of current period accruals on future, 
current and prior period cashflows captures a general mismatch between recorded accruals 
and reported cashflows. This occurs because accruals are used to assign cashflows to 
specific events and time periods, most of which ‘reverse’ themselves within one year’s 
time. Therefore, errors in this model create noise in the accrual-cashflow relationship, 
damaging the beneficial aspects of accrual-based accounting. If wage disparity creates the 
perception of unfairness within employees charged with aspects of the accounting function 
this will lead to reduced effort and information transfer; these effects will be observable as 
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measurement error and will enter into the accounting information system to a higher 
degree. Stated formally, 
 
𝐴𝑄𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑡 +𝜀𝑡   
(4) 
The AQ measure is defined by measuring how well cashflows in periods t-1, t, and 
t+1, explain changes in working capital accruals for year t. The residual from this model 
is utilized to measure accounting quality and as the absolute value of the residual increases, 
this indicates a less stable relationship between cashflows and accrual changes, indicating 
lower accounting quality. If increased pay disparity decreases perceived fairness and leads 
to workers withholding effort and information within the accounting information system, 
then we would expect a positive coefficient for 𝛽1. In contrast, a significant negative 
coefficient for 𝛽1 would support tournament theory predictions that pay disparity 
incentivizes effort and increases accounting quality.  
Next, I introduce my variables of interest into the earnings persistence model; 
specifically, the variable term PAYDISP is a generic term that represents the inclusion of 
one of my three pay disparity proxies described above (CDISP, PDISP, HDISP). CDISP 
is pay disparity in corporate wages calculated as the ratio of the highest paid employment 
level to the lowest paid employment level, PDISP is pay disparity in public accounting 
wages calculated as the ratio of the highest paid employment level to the lowest paid 
employment level, and HDISP is horizontal pay disparity between corporate and public 
accounting wages calculated as the ratio of the average reported pay in corporate 
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accounting and the average reported pay in public accounting. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects and firm clustered standard errors. 
Absolute Abnormal Discretionary Accruals 
Accruals have two components, discretionary and non-discretionary. Non-
discretionary accruals are accruals that naturally, or mechanically, occur due to accounting 
regulation and standard aspects of the accounting system. Discretionary accruals are 
created when accountants apply their discretion in the determination of the nature and 
timing of recognizing economic events and in the application of accounting principles and 
these discretionary accruals are often used as a measurement of accounting quality.   
The model of accruals regularly employed in the accounting literature is the Jones 
model (1991) which proposes the assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are a constant 
factor of the accounting information system; therefore, regressing total accruals on the 
economic activity that directly affects non-discretionary accruals will yield a measure of 
discretionary accruals within the error term. This model is further examined by Kothari, 
Leone, & Wasley, (2005) who find that controlling for prior year performance increases 
the quality of the measurement. Specifically, higher performance levels between years has 
a greater effect on non-discretionary accruals. They examine how performance matching 
greatly increase the reasonableness of the model under extreme performance conditions; 
but they also find that performance matching greatly reduces sample size within industry 
and that the inclusion of prior period return-on-assets has a similar effect with less loss of 
observations. I use the Jones model with the Kothari et. al., identified ROA control to 
estimate firm variation in discretionary accruals. Stated formally,  
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𝑇𝐴𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽11/𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸𝑡 +
𝛽𝑛𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   
(5) 
Specifically, if pay disparity reduces employee effort and information transfer, 
employees charged with maintaining the accounting function will be more likely to utilize 
their discretion in determining the application of accounting principles to achieve a level 
of accounting quality that corresponds to their fairness perceptions. However, if pay 
disparity incentivizes effort and honesty, as in a tournament process, we would expect pay 
disparity to be associated with lower levels of absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA).   
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸𝑡 +
𝛽𝑛𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   
(6) 
Equation 4 regresses the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the 
residual from the Jones (1991) model of accruals, on pay disparity and common controls 
for firm complexity, risk, auditor characteristics, and other known determinants of 
discretionary accruals including the prior year’s return on assets as a control for 
performance (𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡−1) as a control for variance in expected accruals activity (Kothari, 
Leone, & Wasley, 2005). I include controls for the complexity of the size and complexity 
of the firm (SIZE), for firm growth (MTB), for firm cashflow (OCF), and for the firm’s 
financial leverage (LEV).  Further I control for the size of the firm’s auditor (BIGN), if the 
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firm suffered a loss in year t (LOSS). All models include year and industry fixed effects 
and firm clustered standard errors. 
Earnings Persistence   
In addition to reliability or representational faithfulness, I examine if wage disparity 
within the accounting profession impacts the real or perceived relevance of accounting 
information. To assess the relevance of accounting information, I examine the relationship 
between pay disparity in the accounting profession and the ability of current earnings to 
predict future earnings, a concept known as earnings persistence. The earnings persistence 
model utilizes the firm’s income as a proxy for the quality of the firms accounting 
information system. Specifically, if the firm’s accounting information system collects and 
communicates useful, relevant information, then current year accounting information will 
be useful in predicting future accounting income. To investigate the predictive value of 
current year accounting information I regress current earnings on future earnings: 
 
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 × 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
(7) 
 Equation 5 above describes a basic earnings persistence model including industry 
and year fixed effects and standard error calculations are clustered by firm. The model 
above uses return on assets as the primary earnings variable (EARN) and is calculated as 
income before extraordinary items in year t scaled by the company’s average assets held 
during year t. Specifically, a significant and positive coefficient value for 𝛽1 demonstrates 
a predictive relationship between current earnings and future earnings, implying that 
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accounting information has predictive value. In this earnings persistence model, the 
coefficient 𝛽3 represents the incremental effect of pay disparity on the predictive value of 
earnings. If 𝛽3is significantly and negatively (positively) associated with earnings in year 
t+1, then the incremental negative (positive) effect of wage disparity on the predictive 
power of current earnings, and the predictive power of current earnings is weaker (stronger) 
in years when pay disparity is higher. All models include industry and fixed effects and 
firm clustered standard errors. 
The Earnings-Returns Relationship 
An additional way to examine the potential relevance of accounting information is 
to utilize a market-based proxy for accounting information quality; one such proxy is the 
is the earnings-return relationship. Markets use accounting information to value equity 
securities and the value relevance of earnings information is observable in the earnings-
return relationship. As a proxy for the overall quality of the firms accounting system, the 
market’s incremental reaction to earnings information along variation in a variable of 
interest, all else equal, represents the markets differential assessment of accounting 
information quality and its willingness to rely on that information in its value assessment.  
If  the effects of pay disparity on the fairness perceptions of employees charged 
with aspects of the accounting function reduce employee effort or information transfer in 
a way that introduces variation into the market’s perception of the quality of accounting 
information the market will show variation in willingness to incorporate that information 
into a valuation of equity securities.  If wage disparity causes reduced fairness perceptions, 
effort, and information transfer, then the quality of earnings will decrease, and the market 
will be less likely to rely on accounting earnings and other aspects of accounting 
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information; however, if increased pay disparity acts as an effort inducing incentive, I 
would expect an increase in reliance on earnings information associated with pay disparity. 
To investigate the earnings-return relationship, I regress buy and hold earnings for the 
twelve months preceding the release of the audited financial statements (RETURN) on the 
firm’s return on assets (EARN): 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑡 × 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡 +
𝛽10𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   
(8) 
 Again, in equation 8, as in equation 7, I include measures of pay disparity and 
interact those measures with earnings to investigate how the ability of accounting 
information to explain returns varies along dimensions of pay disparity. In this model, a 
significant negative (positive) coefficient on 𝛽3 would be indicative, all else equal, of the 
market providing less (more) reliance on accounting information, specifically earnings 
information, in its evaluation of firm equity value. To control for potential other 
determinants of the earnings-returns relationship I include controls for the complexity of 
the size and complexity of the firm (SIZE, MKTCAP), for firm growth (MTB), for firm 
cashflow (OCF), and for the firm’s financial leverage (LEV).  All models include year and 
industry fixed effects and firm clustered standard errors. 
Wage Trends in Corporate and Public Accounting 
To investigate long run wage trends, I collect data from the Robert Half company, 
an accounting and business focused employment agency that has issued yearly reports on 
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salaries within the accounting profession since 1972. To investigate long run wage trends, 
I collect data from the Robert Half company, an accounting and business focused 
employment agency, whom has issued yearly reports on salaries within the accounting 
profession since 1972. This data set is unique in that its detail providing wage band 
information from entry level to executive for both corporate and public accounting for over 
45 years exceeds data available from public sources like the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
which provides only an occupational average for accounting, auditing and bookkeeping 
since 1988. I join this data with company financial data from Compustat, and capital 
markets data from CRSP as required for the models discussed below. 
The three measures of pay disparity created are overall reported corporate pay 
disparity (CDISP), overall reported public accounting pay disparity (PDISP), and 
horizontal pay disparity between corporate and public accounting as measures as measured 
as the ratio of midpoint of corporate pay reported scaled by the midpoint of public 
accounting pay reported.3  These measures of pay disparity between accounting 
professionals who have a direct impact on reporting quality serve as a measure of potential 
fairness perceptions and wealth based tournament incentives. 
This data collected from ‘Robert Half Financial Yearly Salary Guides’ includes 
salary ranges for multiple employment levels across different accounting related functions. 
I collect data related to corporate and public accounting and employment tiers that are 
consistent through the reporting years. Although general wage data is available since 1967, 
industry specific wage data coded to specific occupations was not collected by the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics until 1988. Further, variation over time in the composition of 
                                                 
3 Generating this ratio using the highest or the lowest levels of corporate of public accounting wages 
reported yields the same results. 
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occupational categories makes a consistent sample difficult to derive over that time period. 
The RobertHalf salary guides are generated by utilizing the firm’s own internal job 
placement wage data and data derived form a survey of their current and potential 
customers. These reports have been created as a guide for hiring processes and comparisons 
and have also been utilized by job seekers. The combination of proprietary employment 
data, survey data, and the use of the reports to set market expectations on both sides of the 
firm’s business relationships between employers and job seekers makes these reports a 
reliable source of wage related data; however, I address supporting evidence for the validity 
of the data below. 
Figure 1 and 2 present the corporate accounting wage data collected from 
RobertHalf wage reports from 1972 to 2017 (Figure 1) and that data adjusted for Inflation 
utilizing the Consumer Price Index reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, respectively. 
Figure 1 shows increasing wages from 1972 to 1990; however, when we compare this 
figure to the same time period in Figure 2 we see that real wages within corporate 
accounting were in decline over that same time period. This corresponds with the growth 
of computerized accounting systems and with their standardization and eventual evolution 
into full ERP systems by the 1990s. Figures 1 and 2 report a stark decline in real wages for 
new hires across the board in both real and nominal wages in 1991 and 1992, these figures 
correspond with a significant macroeconomic recession across both years.  
The recession of 1990-1991 was a unique event in unlike preceding recessionary 
events at the time of this recession it did not have a determinable specific cause, but a 
conflux of credit issues and debt overhangs coming at the end of a long expansion and 
exacerbated by increasing regulation, imprudence within financial institutions, and a 
`52 
 
decrease in both US spending and an increase in global competition (Blanchard, 1993).  
Growth was also anemic in the quarters surrounding this recessionary event, however 
regulatory changes in 1992 and 1992 contribute to changes in the structure of executive 
compensation that contribute to the large spike in CFO earnings observed following this 
recession event. 
The increase in CFO pay starting in 1992 and corresponds to the passage and 
implementation of section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which eliminates the tax 
deductibility for executive non-performance-based compensation in excess of $1 million 
dollars, and changes a 1993 SEC executive compensation disclosure rule change that 
required firms to disclose the compensation of the CEO, CFO, and the three other highest 
paid company executives.  
Although prior research is mixed on its assessment of the contribution that these regulatory 
changes make towards the increasing executive compensation observed through the 1990s 
(Shorter & Labonte, 2007), these prior studies document the same recession-based drop in 
overall income followed by a stark increase in top incomes along this same timeline. 
Frydman & Saks (2010) document the same dip and then rise in executive 
compensation reported in the RobertHalf financial reports over the same time periods; 
figure 4 and figure 5 show this same wage trend among a sample of top executives which 
includes CFOs in addition to CEOs, COOs, Treasurers, and other executives. Piketty, Saez, 
& Stantcheva (2014) model elasticities among three possible responses to changes in 
executive income, Figure 1 of Piketty et al. (2014) reports income data from the Tax Policy 
Center and identifies the same patterns of income reported in the RobertHalf accounting 
wage reports for top 1% incomes levels. Philippon & Reshef (2012) report on wage 
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premiums in the financial industry over time; figures six and seven of their report document 
wage patterns for college graduate and post graduate engineers and financiers (occupations 
with similar educational requirements, professional licensing, and technical skills as 
accounting) that further support the wage level trends reported by the RobertHalf company.  
Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez (2011) collect and report data regarding historical top incomes 
internationally; in their findings, Figure 7a reports the top 1% share of income in English 
speaking countries and income patterns further support the wage levels reported in the 
yearly RobertHalf accounting salary guides. 
Although these studies are not focused on the accounting profession and do provide 
mixed evidence on the role of regulatory changes in the increasing executive incomes after 
the 1990-91 recession; these long run studies of overall wage disparity and specific studies 
of the 1990-91 recession, the IRS162m expense cap, and the 1993 SEC disclosure rule 
change do provide support for the reasonableness and validity of the wage levels reported 
by the RobertHalf organization in their yearly salary guides. To further examine the 
potential effect of the recessionary drop of wage disparity between 1990 and 1991 I 
reperform all analysis and drop all observations from 1990, 1991, and 1992 from the 
sample (untabulated). I find results consistent with the full sample results for all disparity 
ratio models. 
Although general wage data is available from the BLS starting in 1967, industry 
specific wage data and data coded to specific occupations was not collected by the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics until 1988. Further, variation over time in the composition of 
occupational categories makes a consistent sample difficult to derive over that time period 
for specific aspects of the accounting function, or for different types of executives. Figure 
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5 of this study reports CFO compensation tracked against historic wage information 
collected from the BLS and reported per quintile with an additional category for top 5% 
income. An examination of this figure shows reasonable agreement between wage trends 
reported by the BLS and trends in the wage levels reported by RobertHalf. To further assess 
the validity of this reported data, I extract all CFO wage data from Execucomp, which 
documents CFO wages since 2006, figure 6 shows a comparison between CFO wages 
reported in the RobertHalf salary guides and the average of CFO wages reported in 
Execucomp.  Although the average wages reported in Execucomp appear higher than those 
reported in the RobertHalf salary guides, the trends over the comparable sample period are 
similar.  
I use the hand collected data pulled from RobertHalf salary guides to generate pay 
disparity ratios within corporate and public accounting wage structures and between the 
corporate and public accounting professions. Equity theory explains that workers make 
comparisons between their wages and the wages of those with similar skills in similar, but 
not necessarily the same job (Akerlof & Yellen, The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and 
Unemployment, 1990; Rabin, 1993). For this comparison ratio, I utilize the ratio of average 
corporate accounting wages to average public accounting wages. To further examine the 
effect of vertical pay disparity I calculate the ratio of the highest to lowest wage bands 
presented every year in the Robert Half Financial Salary Guides within corporate 
accounting and within public accounting. Higher level manager compensation takes on a 
different meaning when measured against the pay of lower level employees and this pay 
dispersion, operationalized as a ratio, is a primary measure in tournament theory research 
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and the academic discussion of pay disparity (Devers, Albert A. Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 
2007; Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers, 2016) 
Figure 7 presents a visual plot of these ratios over the sample period. The corporate 
and public wage disparity ratios are generated by dividing the highest reported wage level 
by the lowest reported wage level in the relevant category. The public-to-corporate ratio is 
generated by dividing the midpoint between the highest and lowest wages in the corporate 
accounting category by the midpoint between the highest and lowest wages in the public 
accounting category. We see another artifact of the 1990-91 recession followed by 
increased executive wages through stock based compensation reported in prior research in 
the corporate disparity ratio. Hall & Murphy (2003) examine how the increase in stock 
option grants since the SEC disclosure rule change have effected income ratios over time 
and identify the a similar drop in income disparity ratios during the recessionary event of 
1990-91 and an increasing ratio level after which supports the validity of the wage data 
reported in the RobertHalf reports. 
Figure 8 plots the disparity ratios calculated in this study in comparison to the 
overall economic disparity ratios over the same time period reported by the BLS. 
Specifically, the figure 8 includes the ratios of the 95th percentile of overall income divided 
by both the 50th percentile and the 20th percentile. These trends in overall income disparity 
have been increasing steadily over time. When compared to the ratios generated for this 
study we see that corporate accounting pay disparity was declining until the proliferation 
of top executive stock based compensation in the 1990s, but that after the initial increase 
in that decade, has slightly reduced and remained stable since the mid-2000s. Pay disparity 
within the public accounting profession has remained relatively even throughout the 
`56 
 
sample period, and the disparity between corporate and public accounting has actually been 
decreasing over the sample period. Shown in a slightly different visualization in figure 9, 
we are able to see that pay disparity trends in the accounting profession have not followed 
overall economic trends of year over year increases in pay disparity.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of my sample. I include all 
available observations for US firms from CompStat between 1972 and 2017 and join with 
this sample with the calculations of wage disparity within corporate accounting, public 
accounting, and between corporate and public accounting leaving 172,149 firm-year 
observations. This sample is further restricted per the requirements of each specific model. 
For the model of the accruals-cashflow relationship the availability of data required to 
calculate the AQ measure and the included control variables reduces the sample size to 
105,823 firm year observations.  The data required to calculate absolute abnormal 
discretionary accruals (ABSDA) and the included control variables reduces the sample size 
to 95,301 firm year observations for the discretionary accruals model.  The most 
parsimonious model presented is the earnings persistence model, in which the requirements 
for non-missing earnings and future earnings reduces the sample size to 144,153 firm year 
observations and the further requirement for 12 months of buy and hold returns and non-
missing control variables reduces the sample size of the Earnings-Returns relationship 
model to 88,332. 
V. Results 
Accounting Information Quality: The Accruals-Cashflow Relationship 
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 Table 2 presents the results of my investigation of the effect of wage disparity on 
accounting information quality, specifically accounting quality (AQ) as measured in 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) which captures the quality of the accruals-cashflow 
relationship. Column A reports corporate accounting pay disparity (CDISP, 𝛽1 = 0.0007, p 
< 0.083) is significantly and positively associated with unexplained variance within the 
accruals-cashflow relationship, which captures the vertical pay disparity within corporate 
accounting. This result supports the conclusions of equity theory and fair-wage effort 
hypothesis and in that higher levels of pay disparity would cause workers to withhold 
effort, leading to higher degrees of measurement error and uncertainty in accrual 
estimation. Consistent with my findings in the earnings persistence model estimated above 
and with the public accounting employment being consistent with tournament theory, the 
measure of pay disparity within public accounting (PDISP, 𝛽1 = −0. 0628, p < 0.001) is 
reported in column B and shows a significant and negative association with the AQ 
measure, which indicates less unexplained variance within the accruals-cashflow 
relationship and therefore, higher accounting quality. This implies that pay disparity within 
public accounting motivates public accounting incentivizes professionals to detect and 
correct measurement and estimation error within the accounting information system. 
 Column C presents the results of the AQ model with the ratio of corporate wages 
scaled by public accounting wages (HDISP), a model meant to examine if higher corporate 
to public accounting wage disparity engenders perceived unfairness or motivates 
individuals in a manner similar to a tournament prize. Column C reports that the coefficient 
on the measure of horizontal pay disparity is negative and significant (HDISP, 𝛽1 = -
0.3030, p < 0.001) supporting the argument that higher disparity between corporate and 
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public accounting may improve accounting quality. Column D presents the AQ model with 
both the Corporate and Public accounting ratios included  
both the corporate and public accounting pay disparity measures and find the results are 
directionally and statistically consistent. Further, Column E reports the model with all 
disparity ratios included and finds that wage disparity in corporate accounting, the measure 
most easily associated with equity theory, is significantly and positively associated with 
variation in the accruals-cashflow relationship (CDISP, 𝛽1 = 0.0493, p < 0.001) while the 
measures more easily associated with tournament theory are negatively and significantly 
associated with variation in the accruals-cashflow relationship (PDISP, 𝛽1 = -0.1099, p < 
0.001; HDISP, 𝛽1 = -0.3344, p < 0.001), findings that support expectations that higher 
wage disparity within corporate accounting negatively affects quality while disparity 
within public account and between corporate and public accounting increases motivation 
due to the tournament style nature of public accounting employment.  
The Accruals-Cashflow Relationship – Lagged  
 To address the possibility that wage disparity will require some time lag to induce 
either fairness perceptions or tournament-based incentive within employees, and to address 
potential time-based confounding affects I utilize one-year lagged disparity ratios within 
the model. Table 3 presents the results of the AQ accounting quality model with lagged 
disparity ratios. The only inconsistency between the lagged and non-lagged models is the 
coefficient on corporate disparity reported in Table 3 Column A, which is significantly 
negative, implying an increase in accounting quality when corporate pay disparity is 
higher, however, the effect of corporate disparity retains its negative effect on accounting 
quality when public disparity and disparity between corporate and public accounting is 
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included in the models, as reported in columns D and E. The results of this lagged variable 
model support the expectations that equity theory better explains the structure of corporate 
accounting and tournament theory better explains the structure of public accounting, and 
the comparison between the two serves to motivate employees to exert greater effort and 
generate greater quality information.  
The Accruals-Cashflow Relationship – Other Inequality measures 
 This study also examines the potential overall economy-wide wage disparity may 
have on accounting information quality. I collect wage data and pay disparity data from the 
BLS and include three measures of disparity in my accounting quality models. The first 
measure is the GINI coefficient of income inequality. The GINI coefficient is calculated as 
ratio from 0 to 1 that measures the area beneath the uniform distribution line and the 
Lorenzen Curve. Essentially it measures how far from equal distribution the actual 
distribution of income has skewed and represents a measure of overall income inequality 
throughout the entire economy. I also utilize two measures of income disparity reported by 
the BLS on a yearly basis since 1967; the ratio between the 95th percentile of income scaled 
by the 50th percentile of income and the ratio of the 90th percentile of income to the 10th 
percentile of income. Table 4 presents the results of this investigation and reports that all 
measures of overall income inequality are associated with an increase in variation within 
the accruals-cashflow relationship and decreased accounting information quality.  
The Accruals-Cashflow Relationship – Corporate and Public Acc. to Economy Wide 
Wages  
 Next, I scale the highest wage levels in corporate and public accounting by the by 
the 10th, 50th, and 95th income percentiles. This generates a measure of accounting wages 
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in comparison to economy-wide wages. As accounting wages increase when compared 
against economy wide wages accounting quality may improve, however, this comparison, 
if unfavorable, may have negative effects on fairness perceptions. Table 5 presents the 
results of the inclusion of these ratios for both corporate and public accounting and finds 
that comparisons between corporate and public accounting wages and economy-wide 
income levels are associated with decreased accounting quality. Table 6 reports the results 
of the AQ model with both corporate and public accounting ratios included and finds that, 
when considering both measures, higher corporate accounting pay in relation to economy 
wide wages increases the quality of the accruals cashflow relationship and higher public 
accounting pay in relation to economy wide income is associated with greater variance in 
the accruals cashflow relationship. 
The Accruals-Cashflow Relationship – CFO Specific Inequality 
 Recognizing the limitations of using economy wide measures and other measures 
without firm specific variation this study generates a CFO specific measure of disparity. 
Utilizing the ExecuComp database I scale the firm-year CFO total compensation by the 
10th, 50th, and 95th income percentiles. Due to data availability this measure is only 
available from 2006 to 2017 and reduces the sample size 15,049 firm year observations. 
This test investigates how firm specific wage disparity of the CFO may generate either 
negative fairness perceptions or provide a motivational incentive to increase effort. Table 
7 reports the results of this investigation and finds that across all three economy wide 
disparity measures, higher CFO specific pay is associated with increased accounting 
quality from the period of 2006 to 2017. These results support a tournament theory 
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explanation of CFO specific pay improving accounting quality through the reduction of 
variance in the accruals-cashflows relationship.    
Accounting Quality: Discretionary Accruals 
Discretionary accruals represent management’s ability to exercise discretion in the 
nature and timing in the recognition of firm cashflows. If wage disparity creates fairness 
effects, I expect that discretionary accruals will increase as those in the accounting function 
exercise discretion in accruals behavior instead of reducing measurement error or otherwise 
increasing reconciliation activity. Tournament theory predicts that higher pay disparity 
would induce employee effort and improve quality, leading to a lower need for the 
application of discretionary accruals in response to accounting irregularities. I follow prior 
research and utilize established methodologies to generate firm specific performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals; specifically, following Kothari et. al. (2005), I use changes 
in revenue, inventory, and other accounts to predict the non-discretionary relationship 
between economic activities and accrual levels while controlling for firm performance. The 
residual error from this model, representing unexplained variation in discretionary 
accruals, is utilized as a measure of discretionary accrual levels.  
Table 8 reports the result of my regression of the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (ABSDA) on measures of pay disparity. Column A reports that corporate 
accounting pay disparity is positively associated with levels of absolute discretionary 
accruals (CDISP, 𝛽1 = 0.0069, p < 0.001) and is consistent with the fair-wage effort 
hypothesis that employees will apply discretionary accruals to reduce effort in response to 
pay disparity. In column B, higher levels of pay disparity within public accounting are 
associated with lower abnormal discretionary accruals (PDISP, 𝛽1 = -0.0101, p < 0.001) 
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as is the ratio or corporate to public wages reported in column C (PDISP, 𝛽1 = -0.1300, p 
< 0.001). These findings support the argument that higher pay disparity incentivizes public 
accounting employees through their year over year promotion employment structure which 
better replicates a tournament setting. Column D and column E report that these results are 
robust to including both the corporate and public accounting disparity ratios and all ratios 
in the models, respectively.  
Discretionary Accruals – Lagged  
To address the possibility that wage disparity will require some time lag to induce either 
fairness perceptions or tournament-based incentive within employees, and to address 
potential time-based confounding affects I utilize one-year lagged disparity ratios within 
the model. Table 9 presents the results of the Discretionary Accruals model with lagged 
disparity ratios. The use of lagged disparity ratios produces fully consistent results across 
all model specifications. This supports the validity of the investigation by reducing 
temporal ambiguity between the independent and dependent variables while also reducing 
the possibility of co-occurrence based alternative explanations.  
Discretionary Accruals – Other Inequality measures 
 This study also examines the potential overall economy wide wage disparity may 
have on accounting information quality. Utilizing the three measures of economy-wide 
disparity discussed above, Table 10 presents the results of this investigation and reports 
that all measures of overall income inequality are associated with an increase in variation 
within the accruals-cashflow relationship and decreased accounting information quality. 
This result implies that wage inequality reduces effort overall, and as employees are 
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affected by fairness concerns, their general effort and information transfer related to 
accounting-based tasks is reduced. 
Discretionary Accruals – Corporate and Public Accounting to Economy Wide Wages  
To investigate how comparisons between the highest wage levels in corporate and 
public accounting wages and economy wide wage levels, I again scale the highest wage 
levels in corporate and public accounting by the by the 10th, 50th, and 95th income 
percentiles. These tests examine if the increasing wage disparity at the highest income 
levels of corporate and public accounting, in comparison to economy wide income levels, 
are associated with variation in accounting quality. Table 11 presents the results of the 
inclusion of these ratios for both corporate and public accounting and finds that 
comparisons between corporate and public accounting wages and economy-wide income 
levels are associated with decreased accounting quality. Table 12 reports the results of the 
ABSDA model with both corporate and public accounting ratios included and finds that, 
when considering both measures, higher corporate accounting pay in relation to economy 
wide wages increases the quality of the accruals cashflow relationship and higher public 
accounting pay in relation to economy wide income is associated with higher overall 
discretionary accruals in all cases.  
Discretionary Accruals – CFO Specific Inequality 
 To examine how CFO specific variation in wage disparity may affect accounting 
quality I scale the firm-year CFO total compensation by the 10th, 50th, and 95th income 
percentiles. Due to data availability this measure is only available from 2006 to 2017 and 
reduces the sample size 17,459 firm year observations. This test investigates how firm 
specific wage disparity of the CFO may generate either negative fairness perceptions or 
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provide a motivational incentive to increase effort. Table 13 reports the results of this 
investigation and finds that across all three economy wide disparity measures, higher CFO 
specific pay is associated with increased accounting quality from the period of 2006 to 
2017. These results support an equity theory interpretation of CFO specific wage disparity, 
when compared to economy wide wage levels, through an association with higher levels 
of discretionary accruals.  
Accounting Quality: Earnings Persistence 
 Now I examine how wage disparity may affect the relevance factor of accounting 
information quality. Table 14 reports the results of my investigation of the association 
between wage trends in the accounting profession and earnings persistence. Column B 
reports the coefficient on the variable of interest 𝛽3 is significantly negative for the first 
measure of pay disparity (EARN×CDISP, 𝛽3 = -0.0446, p < 0.001), which captures the 
vertical pay disparity within corporate accounting. This result supports the equity theory 
hypothesis that higher levels of pay disparity would cause workers to withhold effort and 
information, which would be observable in the output quality of the accounting information 
system. Column C and Column D report the results from the earnings persistence model 
when including the pay disparity ratio for public accounting wages and the ratio between 
corporate and public accounting. Both models report the effect of corporate accounting 
wages as having a significantly negative association with earnings persistence, a finding 
that supports the fair wage-effort hypothesis of equity theory that higher wage disparity 
creates negative fairness perceptions that reduce employee effort and information transfer. 
In these models, however, both public accounting wage disparity and disparity in the 
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corporate to public accounting ratios do not show a significant relationship with earnings 
persistence.  
 Column E and F report the results of the models including both the corporate and 
public accounting ratios and al disparity ratios respectively. These models find that higher 
levels of corporate account wage disparity are associated with lower earnings persistence 
while the incremental effect of higher wage disparity within public accounting is associated 
with higher earnings persistence.  The results of the corporate to public accounting wage 
disparity ratio are inconclusive. These results provide some evidence of the differential 
nature of employment and career structures between corporate and public accounting. 
Specifically, public accounting employment follows a structure more consistent with 
tournament theory. Periodic evaluations and set promotion schedules mirror a multi period 
tournament where participants know providing additional effort will increase their ability 
to access future rounds of the tournament.  Further the effect of corporate accounting wage 
disparity shows a significant association with reduce accounting quality across all models.  
Earnings Persistence – Lagged  
  Table 15 reports the results of my examination of lagged wage disparity on the 
ability of current earnings to predict future earnings. This particular test is of greater 
importance due to the complex nature of the relevance of accounting information. 
Specifically, although current period disparity may directly affect current period accrual 
balances and their relationship with cashflows, earnings persistence is subject to a greater 
effect of the inertia of the overall business process. In these tests, column B reports a 
significant negative association between corporate accounting wage disparity and earnings 
persistence while column C reports a significant positive association between public 
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accounting wage disparity and earnings persistence. Column D reports the results form 
including the corporate to public disparity ratio in the earnings persistence model and finds 
no significant incremental association between the corporate to public accounting disparity 
ratio and earnings persistence. Column E and F report the results of including both the 
corporate and public accounting disparity ratios and all accounting disparity ratios, 
respectively, and finds that both corporate accounting wage disparity remains significantly 
associated with a reduction in earnings persistence and public accounting wage disparity is 
associated with higher levels of earnings persistence. These findings support the argument 
that the structure of employment in corporate accounting supports an equity theory 
assessment of wage disparity and the structure of public accounting employment resembles 
a tournament environment. 
Earnings Persistence – Other Inequality measures 
This study also examines the potential overall economy wide wage disparity may 
have on accounting information quality. Table 16 presents the results of including three 
measures of economy wide disparity within the models of earnings persistence. These 
models find that the GINI coefficient of overall income inequality and the ratio of the 95th 
to 50th percentile measure of overall income inequality are associated with decreased 
earnings persistence. While the 90th to 10th percentile measure is insignificant. This result 
supports the argument that increasing income inequality affects the production of quality 
accounting information by reducing the effort and information transfer of those involved 
in the accounting and reporting process who are generally at or above the median income 
level. 
Earnings Persistence – Corporate and Public Accounting to Economy Wide Wages  
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To investigate how comparisons between the highest wage levels in corporate and 
public accounting wages and economy wide wage levels, I include the corporate and public 
accounting wages scaled by economy wide wage percentiles as described above. Table 17 
presents the results of the inclusion of these ratios for both corporate and public accounting 
and finds that comparisons between corporate wages and economy-wide income levels are 
associated with decreased accounting quality through lower earnings persistence, but no 
such affect is observable for public accounting wages. Table 18 reports the results of the 
earning persistence model with both corporate and public accounting ratios included and 
finds that, when considering both measures, higher corporate and public accounting pay in 
relation to economy wide wages is associated with lower earnings persistence when 
compared to the bottom 10% of economy wide income, but is associated with improved 
earnings persistence when compared to the median economy wide income.  
Earnings Persistence – CFO Specific Inequality 
To examine how CFO specific variation in wage disparity may affect accounting 
quality I scale the firm-year CFO total compensation by the 10th, 50th, and 95th income 
percentiles. Due to data availability this measure is only available from 2006 to 2017 and 
reduces the sample size 15,735 firm year observations. This test investigates how firm 
specific wage disparity of the CFO may generate either negative fairness perceptions or 
provide a motivational incentive to increase effort. Table 19 reports the results of this 
investigation and finds that across all three economy wide disparity measures, higher CFO 
specific pay is associated with lower earnings persistence from the period of 2006 to 2017. 
These results support an equity theory interpretation of CFO specific wage disparity, when 
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compared to economy wide wage levels, through an association with lower accounting 
quality. 
Earnings–Returns Relationship 
Table 20 presents the results of my investigation of how the effect of pay disparity 
will be observable within the earnings return relationship.  The ability of earnings to 
explain returns is a common proxy for the quality of accounting information, and as wage 
disparity either creates fairness perceptions that result in a reduction of employee effort 
and information transfer or incentives tournament-based behavior, that effect may be 
observable in this relationship. As reported in column B and C, the coefficient on the 
interaction of corporate wage disparity and earnings and public accounting wage disparity 
and earnings are both insignificant whole Column D reports a significant association 
between corporate to public accounting wage disparity and earnings response 
(EARN×HDISP, 𝛽3 = 0.2916, p < 0.001) indicating the incremental explanatory power of 
earnings to returns varies in a significant and positive association with pay disparity 
between corporate and public accounting, essentially, as corporate pay increases over 
public accounting pay this provides an incentive for accounting employees to exert more 
effort and generate higher quality information.  
Column F reports the results of the including all disparity ratios in the specified 
earnings-returns relationship model. This model does finds results consistent with the other 
models of accounting quality; corporate pay disparity is significantly associated with 
reduced earnings response (EARN×CDISP, 𝛽3 = −0.0777, p < 0.0103) while the corporate 
to public disparity ratio is associated with increased earnings response (EARN×HDISP, 𝛽7 
= 0.1309, p < 0.0017). This implies that the fairness effects of corporate accounting 
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disparity are discernable within the accounting quality related to earnings response and that 
disparity between the public and corporate accounting areas either increases the fairness 
perceptions of corporate accountants when their pay is higher than public accounting, or 
provides public accounting practitioners who expect to move to the corporate accounting 
function with greater incentives toward effort and quality.  
Earnings–Returns Relationship – Lagged  
  Table 21 reports the results of my examination of lagged wage disparity on the 
observable effects of accounting quality on the earnings-returns relationship. This test 
helps address temporal ambiguity within the measurements and alleviate concerns about 
the association being a factor of co-occurring events. Column F reports the results of 
including all accounting disparity ratios, and finds that lagged corporate accounting wage 
disparity remains significantly associated with a reduction in the earnings return 
relationship while corporate to public accounting disparity is associated with an increased 
earnings response. These findings support the argument that the structure of employment 
in corporate accounting supports an equity theory assessment of wage disparity and the 
structure of public accounting employment resembles a tournament environment. 
Earnings–Returns Relationship – Other Inequality measures 
This study also examines the potential overall economy wide wage disparity may 
have on accounting information quality. Table 22 presents the results of including three 
measures of economy wide disparity within the models of earnings persistence. All three 
measures of economy wide income inequality are significant and negatively associated 
with the earnings-returns relationship. This result supports the argument that increasing 
income inequality affects the production of quality accounting information by reducing the 
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effort and information transfer of those involved in the accounting and reporting process 
which is observable through a reduced earnings response.  
Earnings–Returns Relationship – Corporate and Public Accounting to Economy Wide 
Wages  
To investigate how comparisons between the highest wage levels in corporate and 
public accounting wages and economy wide wage levels, I include the corporate and public 
accounting wages scaled by economy wide wage percentiles as described above into the 
models separately. Table 23 presents the results of the inclusion of these ratios for both 
corporate and public accounting and finds corporate accounting disparity is associated with 
a reduced earnings response. Table 24 reports the results of the earning persistence model 
with both corporate and public accounting ratios included together and finds that, when 
considering both measures, higher corporate accounting disparity is associated with a lower 
earnings response, but public accounting disparity is not. 
Earnings–Returns Relationship – CFO Specific Disparity 
To examine how CFO specific variation in wage disparity may affect accounting 
quality I scale the firm-year CFO total compensation by the 10th, 50th, and 95th income 
percentiles. Due to data availability this measure is only available from 2006 to 2017 and 
reduces the sample size 10,677 firm year observations. This test investigates how firm 
specific wage disparity of the CFO may generate either negative fairness perceptions or 
provide a motivational incentive to increase effort. Table 25 reports the results of this 
investigation and finds that across all three economy wide disparity measures, higher CFO 
specific pay is not associated with the earnings-return relationship from the period of 2006 
to 2017.  
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Utilization of different Clustered Standard Errors across models 
 RobertHalf reports wage levels across different corporate size bands based on the 
firm’s total assets. As a robustness test, I run the tour primary models (AQ, ABSDA, EP, 
and ERC) and their lagged variants with standard errors clustered around these size bands 
and include gvkey as a firm specific fixed effect.  Utilizing this different approach to 
clustering standard errors yields the consistent results for the discretionary accruals and 
accounting quality models. This alternative specification of standard error clustering; 
however, yields insignificant results for the earnings persistence model and its lagged 
variant while generating an ERC model with more significant coefficients.  Taken together, 
this variant supports the general findings of the paper in regards to the effect of wage 
disparity on the relevance and reliability of information.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
In this study, I investigate how wage disparity and the nature of advancement as an 
absolute or relative path has potential effects on the production of accounting information. 
I analyze 45 years of data regarding the degree or wage disparity in corporate and public 
accounting and its effect on information quality. Utilizing the differential employment 
structure of corporate and public accounting; I argue that the relative advancement 
structure of corporate accounting increases uncertainty and the perception of unfairness in 
wage structures while the absolute performance measures within public accounting 
incentivize effort.  
These results are robust to an examination of the underlying data and lead-lag 
examinations of the associations between the measures of wage disparity and information 
quality. I cannot however, derive fully causal identification of these effects. Further, these 
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measures represent a time series that spans 45 years and may be subject to forces external 
to the model that bias both the independent and dependent variables. Due to a lack of 
granularity within the data itself; these measures produce low variance and although results 
may be statistically significant; the explanatory power of the model may be small. This 
study hopes to inform public accounting and corporate accounting managers and 
executives how the structure of compensation and the perceived fairness of wages may 
affect accounting information quality. Pay disparity is associated with accounting 
information quality and if the potential fairness effects described in equity theory affect 
workers differently under the condition of relative performance tournaments or absolute 
performance evaluation these results have managerial and regulatory implications for the 
corporate and public accounting labor markets. 
I regress four measures of information quality on these disparity measures; two 
measures of predictive value and two measures od feedback value. I find that higher levels 
of pay disparity within corporate accounting are associated with reduced accounting 
information quality, and that pay disparity within the public accounting labor market is 
associated with higher accounting quality. Additionally, I find that horizontal pay disparity 
between corporate accounting and public accounting is associated with higher accounting 
quality; suggesting that when corporate accounting wage potential is higher, this serves as 
an incentivizing factor for auditors who have the ability to automatically progress and exit 
public accounting into corporate accounting at higher wage levels. These findings join a 
growing national conversation regarding pay disparity and income inequality; and although 
wage stagnation and increasing income inequality may be an issue economy wide, the 
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accounting profession has not seen the same levels of wage stagnation or stochastically 
increasing wage disparity.  
This investigation into wages and pay disparity over the last 45 years in the 
accounting profession, and its differential effect between corporate and public accounting, 
provides insights into a professional labor market that provides significant oversight to 
global financial markets and ensures accountability for most advanced economic activity. 
Wage stagnation and its contribution to growing levels of income and wealth inequality is 
becoming more contentious for policy makers, regulators, and employers with every 
passing year. The accounting profession has long been viewed as a stable profession and a 
profession that affords a comfortable life to its members. It is important to understand how 
pay disparity in the accounting profession affects the production of accounting information 
so that employers, policy makers, and regulators may understand and manage the 
production of accounting information.  
Together these results show the importance of pay disparity within corporate 
accounting as a determinant of accounting quality and how tension exists between the 
firm’s fundamental desire to maximize profitability and their fundamental duty to provide 
quality accounting information to shareholders. These findings provide insight and 
fundamental understanding to how the labor market for corporate and public accounting 
professionals affects the quality of accounting information available to market participants. 
It raises questions regarding the differential structures of employment and career 
advancement within corporate accounting and public accounting and how these differences 
affect information quality. Future research in this area may explore how pay disparity, 
serving as an incentivizing and rationalizing factor, may affect the likelihood of fraud or 
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misstatement. Future studies may investigate how the different structures of labor markets 
within the accounting profession force selection between employment markets and the 
benefits and detriments associated with this selection process.  
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Table 0 - Panel A: Review of Equity Theory, Fairness, and Reciprocity Research in Economics 
Year Author(s) Title Journal Objective Method / Data Conclusion 
1982 George A. 
Akerlof 
Labor Contracts 
as Partial Gift 
Exchange 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
To explain 
involuntary 
unemployment as 
derived as a 
response to worker 
behavior 
A model that 
describes the 
provision of effort 
as a ‘gift’ in 
response to higher 
than market 
clearing wages 
Labor contracts, 
when viewed as 
partial gift 
exchanges, both 
influence and are 
influenced by the 
workers’ social 
norms and 
perceptions. 
1982 William J. 
Baumol 
Applied Fairness 
Theory and 
Rationing Policy 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
To offer an 
understanding of 
how fairness theory 
can help economist 
apply economic 
theory to public 
policy analysis  
Discussion of prior 
research and an 
analytical model of 
commodity 
rationing and 
fairness 
considerations 
A fairness criterion 
can be applied to 
concrete problems 
and through doing so, 
one can obtain non-
obvious results that 
better describe real 
activity 
1984 George A. 
Akerlof 
Gift Exchange 
and Efficiency 
Wage Theory: 
Four Views  
American 
Economic 
Review 
Provides 
commentary on 
partial gift 
exchange. 
Discussion of four 
paradigms of 
efficiency wages / 
Analytic 
Although payments 
beyond market 
clearing prices seem 
counter intuitive to 
rational economists, 
evidence exists that 
this phenomenon are 
common and 
naturally occurring 
1986 Kahneman, 
Knetsch and 
Thaler 
Fairness as a 
Constraint on 
Profit Seeking: 
Entitlements in 
the Market 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
Are profitable, 
honest, and even 
expected actions in 
the market viewed 
as exploitive and 
unfair? 
Discussion of prior 
research and 
presentation of 
survey results of 
320 CEO business 
executives 
An individual’s sense 
of entitlement affects 
market exchange 
outcomes and distorts 
equilibria unless the 
analysis includes 
fairness as a factor 
1987 George A. 
Akerlof and 
Janet L. 
Yellen 
Rational Models 
of Irrational 
Behavior 
American 
Economic 
Review 
Provides 
commentary on 
how fairness 
explains departure 
from rational 
economics 
Discussion of 
rational economics 
and Keynesian 
theory  
Keynesian 
economics explain 
behavioral 
irregularities known 
to occur within 
economic activities 
and documented in 
psychological and 
sociological research. 
1988 George A. 
Akerlof and 
Janet L. 
Yellen 
Fairness and 
Unemployment 
American 
Economic 
Review 
Presents an 
efficiency wage 
model based on 
fairness  
Discussion of 
fairness theories / 
Analytic 
These models of 
fairness explain 
observed wage 
disparities between 
occupations and 
industries and 
mitigate the concern 
of traditional wage 
models that cannot 
explain 
unemployment 
within a utilitarian, 
fully maximizing 
hedonistic world. 
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1990 George A. 
Akerlof and 
Janet L. 
Yellen 
The Fair Wage-
Effort Hypothesis 
and 
Unemployment 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
Describe and 
discuss the fair 
wage-effort 
hypothesis and its 
consequences 
Analytical 
description of the 
fair wage-effort 
hypothesis  
Workers 
proportionately 
withdraw effort as 
their actual wage 
falls short of their 
fair wage; the fair 
wage perception is 
derived from 
comparisons between 
wages, between 
workers and 
managers, and 
between workers and 
firm profitability 
1991 Peter 
Cappelli and 
Keith 
Chauvin 
An Interplant Test 
of the Efficiency 
Wage Hypothesis 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
Directly tests the 
main arguments of 
efficiency wage 
models that wage 
premiums and the 
risk of losing them 
prevent shirking  
Plant level data 
from a large auto 
manufacturer 
Greater wage 
premiums and 
conditions in the 
labor market r 
making it more 
difficult to find 
alternative 
employment are 
associated with lower 
levels of shirking  
 
1992 Vesna 
Prasnikar and 
Alvin E. Roth 
Considerations of 
Fairness and 
Strategy: 
Experimental 
Data From 
Sequential Games 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
To better 
understand 
differential 
outcomes between 
experiments 
regarding fairness 
and game theory 
Procedures to 
differentiate 
between 
endogenous 
aspects of common 
experimental 
games 
Although game-
theoretic predictions 
remain pertinent, the 
effect of fairness 
considerations cannot 
be ignored  
1993 David I. 
Levine 
Fairness, 
Markets, and 
Ability to Pay: 
Evidence from 
Compensation 
Executives 
American 
Economic 
Review 
To examine real 
evidence of wage 
adjustments by 
corporate 
executives 
A unique data set 
based on surveys 
of 139 
compensation 
executives 
regarding potential 
wage adjustments 
Considerations of 
equity are an 
important factor in 
managing a 
company’s internal 
wage structure in 
response to market 
forces. 
1993 Main, 
O'Reilly, and 
Wade 
Top Executive 
Pay: Tournament 
or Teamwork? 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
Investigate the 
effects of pay 
dispersion within a 
firm’s top 
management team 
Data analysis of 
executive 
 compensation for 
two thousand 
executives per year 
over a 5-year 
period 
Top management 
team pay appears to 
follow a sequential 
tournament structure  
1993 Matthew 
Rabin 
Incorporating 
Fairness into 
Game Theory and 
Economics 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
Formal modeling of 
reciprocity and 
fairness will help us 
better understand 
economic activity 
Discussion of prior 
research and 
analytical 
modeling to 
incorporate 
fairness 
considerations into 
game theory 
Extending a 
generalized ‘kindness 
function’ to 
economic models 
under complete or in-
complete information 
is essential to applied 
economic research  
1993 Albert Rees The Role of 
Fairness in Wage 
Determination 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To present 
anecdotal evidence 
that wage 
Discussion / Essay Neoclassical wage 
theory is not 
necessarily wrong, 
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comparisons are a 
powerful 
determinant of 
satisfaction 
but without a 
consideration of the 
effect of wage 
comparisons, it is 
incomplete 
1993 Ernst Fehr, 
Georg 
Kirchsteiger 
and Arno 
Riedl 
Does Fairness 
Prevent Market 
Clearing? An 
Experimental 
Investigation 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
To investigate how 
fairness affects 
market prices  
Experiments 
designed how 
minimum wage 
impacts fairness 
perceptions and 
labor prices 
Sellers responded to 
prices substantially 
above the market-
clearing level higher 
levels of quality, 
supporting the fair 
wage-effort theory 
1995 Teck-Hua Ho 
and 
Xuanming Su 
Peer-Induced 
Fairness in 
Games 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
To determine the 
extent to which 
fairness perceptions 
depend on an 
assessment of peer 
endowment 
Experiments 
involving Two 
independent 
ultimatum games  
Peer induced fairness 
perceptions are twice 
as strong as those 
between leader and 
follower; 50% of 
subjects are fairness 
minded  
1998 Monica 
Galizzi and 
Kevin Lang 
Relative Wages, 
Wage Growth, 
and Quit 
Behavior 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
If wage comparison 
between workers’ 
wages and the 
opportunity for 
future wage growth 
affect quit 
decisions 
Italian Social 
Security records 
for male workers 
from a sample of 
firms in Turin 
from 1981 to 1983 
Workers consider 
their wages relative 
to other wages, in 
both short-term and 
long-term models. 
when making 
employment 
decisions  
1999 Ernst Fehr 
and Armin 
Falk 
Wage Rigidity in 
a Competitive 
Incomplete 
Contract Market 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To understand if 
workers underbid 
wages and if 
employers take 
advantage of 
underbidding  
Four double-
auction sessions 
with incomplete 
labor contracts and 
four with complete 
contracts 
Although workers 
will underbid wages, 
employers reject 
underbidding as it is 
costly if the worker 
has discretion over 
effort, when 
performance 
incentives exist 
1999 Ernst Fehr 
and Klaus M. 
Schmidt 
A Theory of 
Fairness, 
Competition and 
Cooperation 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
Does a common 
principle explain 
differential 
behavior between 
markets and 
bilateral contract 
negotiations 
Analytical models 
with experiments 
including dictator 
and market games 
Distributional 
preferences are 
context dependent, 
and based on the 
environment in 
which fairness is 
considered agents 
may be altruistic or 
selfish 
2000 Douglas A. 
Hibbs Jr. and 
Håkan 
Locking 
Wage Dispersion 
and Productive 
Efficiency: 
Evidence for 
Sweden 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
Investigate a 
natural shock to 
wage compression 
in Sweden and the 
effect of wage 
compression on 
macroeconomic 
productivity 
Regression models 
utilizing Swedish 
macroeconomic 
wage and output 
data from 1964 to 
1993 
Evidence suggests 
that wage dispersion 
effects are detectable 
between industries 
and firms, but not 
within industries and 
firms 
2000 James 
Konow 
Fair Shares: 
Accountability 
and Cognitive 
Dissonance in 
Allocation 
Decisions 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
This paper 
investigates the 
roles of fairness, 
self-interest, and 
self- deception in 
Analytical models 
to describe and 
experimental 
procedures to 
measure   
Fairness concerns 
may be affected, 
mitigated, or 
amplified by the 
individual’s 
cognitive dissonance 
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the allocation of 
economic rewards 
regarding 
distributional 
outcomes 
2000 Gary E 
Bolton and 
Axel 
Ockenfels 
A Theory of 
Equity, 
Reciprocity, and 
Competition 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
To describe why 
isolated 
investigations of 
equity and 
reciprocity diverge 
in their findings 
A model that 
combines self 
interest and group 
standing to explain 
disparate 
observations 
The ERC model 
(equity, reciprocity, 
and competition) 
describes laboratory 
behavior in a simple 
and intuitive way 
2001 Henrich, 
Boyd, 
Bowles, 
Camerer 
Fehr, Gintis, 
and 
McElreath 
Cooperation, 
Reciprocity and 
Punishment in 
Fifteen Small-
scale Societies 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
To investigate how 
fairness and 
personal interest 
are universal / 
fundamental human 
traits 
Field experiments 
performed within 
hunter-gather 
tribes 
The argument that 
humans act in pure 
self-interest is not 
supported in any of 
the experimental 
outcomes; these 
findings are 
consistent with 
economic patterns 
2002 Hannan, 
Kagel and 
Moser 
Partial Gift 
Exchange in an 
Experimental 
Labor Market: 
Impact of Subject 
Population 
Differences, 
Productivity 
Differences, and 
Effort Requests 
on Behavior 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To test the Akerlof 
gift exchange 
model in an 
environment where 
there is no 
punishment for 
providing 
minimum effort 
Experiments with 
undergraduate and 
experienced MBA 
students 
Workers provide 
higher effort for 
higher wages in the 
absence of an 
enforcement 
mechanism for 
shirking, work 
experience increases 
these effects 
2002 Gary 
Charness and 
Matthew 
Rabin 
Understanding 
Social 
Preferences with 
Simple Tests 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
An attempt to 
address pervasive 
and fundamental 
confounds within 
the experimental 
procedures used in 
prior studies 
Experimental 
games designed to 
address prior 
research where 
personal 
maximization and 
reciprocity are 
confounded 
Participants sacrifice 
value to increase 
overall welfare more 
so than to reduce 
differences and are 
motivated by 
reciprocity to punish 
unfair behavior or to 
achieve a fair 
outcome 
2004 Dirk 
Engelmann 
and Martin 
Strobel 
Inequality 
Aversion, 
Efficiency, and 
Maximin 
Preferences in 
Simple 
Distribution 
Experiments 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
To compare the 
relative importance 
of inequality 
aversion, concerns 
for efficiency, and 
maximin 
preferences. 
Thirteen 
experimental 
treatments in three 
session examining 
allocation 
decisions between 
participants 
Concerns about 
efficiency, 
preferences, and 
basic human 
selfishness 
rationalize allocation 
decisions as well as 
inequality concerns 
2004 Gary 
Charness 
Attribution and 
Reciprocity in an 
Experimental 
Labor Market 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To investigate 
variation in effort 
provision when 
wages can be 
attributed to an 
employer or to an 
external party 
An experiment 
with participants 
paired between 10 
employees and 
employers over 10 
rounds 
Both distributional 
equity and 
reciprocity affect 
effort provision 
based on variation 
within both the wage 
levels and the 
attribution of wages  
2005 Alberto 
Alesina and 
George-
Fairness and 
Redistribution 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
To describe how 
tax policies affect 
beliefs about the 
fairness of social 
Analytical 
modeling of 
multiple ‘self-
The demand for 
fairness creates 
persistence in social 
and political beliefs 
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Marios 
Angeletos 
competition and 
income inequality 
fulfilling’ 
equilibria 
that can lead to 
complimentary but 
divergent outcomes 
2006 Alexandre 
Mas 
Pay, Reference 
Points, and Police 
Performance 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
Utilizing police 
union arbitration to 
examine 
differential 
performance based 
on wage 
differentials and 
expectations 
Examination of 
New Jersey Police 
Union wage 
requests and 
actuals 
When wage requests 
are not met several 
measures of 
performance decline, 
and this decline is 
associated with the 
level of difference 
between expected 
wage and actual 
wage 
2006 Armin Falk, 
Ernst Fehr, 
Christian 
Zehnder 
Fairness 
perceptions and 
reservation 
wages— 
The behavioral 
effects of 
minimum Wage 
laws 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
To understand the 
effect that 
minimum wage 
levels has on 
workers reservation 
wages  
Experiment where 
workers initial 
reservation wages 
are rejected if they 
are higher than the 
offer the worker 
receives 
The presence of a 
minimum wage has 
positive employment 
outcomes; workers 
do not reduce 
reservation wages 
when the minimum 
wage is removed 
2007 Cappelen, 
Hole, 
Sørensen, and 
Tungodden 
The Pluralism of 
Fairness Ideals: 
An Experimental 
Approach 
American 
Economic 
Review 
Estimate the weight 
people attach 
fairness across 
different ‘ideal’ 
fairness paradigms 
One-shot ‘dictator 
game’ experiment 
where production 
depend on factors 
within and beyond 
individual control 
Individuals tradeoff 
between self-interest 
and egalitarianism 
when attaching 
weight to fairness 
concerns across 
different scenarios of 
distributive justice 
2007 Francis 
Bloch, 
Garance 
Genicot, And 
Debra Ray 
Reciprocity in 
Groups and the 
Limits to Social 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
To describe the 
way the fragility of 
subgroups limits 
reciprocity within 
groups 
A model of self-
enforcing 
reciprocity in 
groups that 
stresses the 
importance of 
subgroups and 
introduces a 
concept of fragility 
The limit of social 
capital occurs when 
the fragility of 
subgroups increases 
the value of 
coordinated deviation 
from the norm of 
mutual aid 
2010 Goerg, Kube 
and Zultan 
Treating Equals 
Unequally: 
Incentives in 
Teams, Workers’ 
Motivation, and 
Production 
Technology 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
How different 
reward schemes 
and production 
technologies affect 
effort provisioning 
within teams 
Experiment 
designed to 
interact equity 
considerations and 
reward schemes 
with the 
production 
function 
Unequal rewards 
have the potential to 
increase productivity 
and coordination and 
this effect varies with 
the characteristics of 
the production 
function 
2011 Pamela 
Jakiela 
Social 
Preferences and 
Fairness Norms 
as Informal 
Institutions: 
Experimental 
Evidence 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
To investigate how 
the effects of 
institutional norms 
vary with the reach 
of governmental 
power  
Experiments 
utilizing dictator 
games and 
variance in status 
across conditions 
and between US 
and Kenyan 
participants 
The way relative 
status and fairness 
perceptions affect 
allocation decisions  
differs substantially 
across cultures 
2012 Sebastian 
Kube, Michel 
André 
Maréchal, 
The Currency of 
Reciprocity: 
Gift Exchange in 
the Workplace 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
How do non-
monetary vs 
monetary ‘gifts’ 
affect worker effort  
Field experiment 
where workers 
either payed a 
bonus, given a gift, 
Pay only showed no 
increase in effort 
while the gift did; 
when allowed the 
choice, most workers 
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and Clemens 
Puppe 
or can choose 
between the two 
chose the money, but 
provided extra effort 
2013 Cappelen, 
Konow, 
Sørensen and 
Tungodden 
Just Luck: An 
Experimental 
Study of Risk-
Taking and 
Fairness 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
Investigate fairness 
perceptions 
between risk-takers 
and risk avoiders 
and the distribution 
between lucky and 
unlucky risk-takers 
An experiment 
with a risk-taking 
phase and a 
distributional 
phase with pooled 
earnings between 
pairs of 
participants 
People consider 
fairness in context 
and seek to alleviate 
unfair distributions 
but disagree 
considerably on the 
fair allocation of 
gains and losses 
2017 Dirk Sliwka 
and Peter 
Werner 
Wage Increases 
and the Dynamics 
of Reciprocity 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To understand if 
the timing and 
knowledge of wage 
in increases affect 
the provisioning of 
labor 
Employee / 
employer pairs 
over 8 periods 
with random 
pairing and blind 
performance  
Employees work 
harder when wages 
are increasing, but 
they do not know the 
increase structure in 
advance 
2019 Dube, 
Giuliano, and 
Leonard 
Fairness and 
Frictions: The 
Impact of 
Unequal Raises 
on Quit Behavior 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
How do unequal 
raises affect quit 
behavior and do 
workers rely on 
peer comparisons 
or market 
comparisons 
Regression 
discontinuity using 
30 months of data 
from a large retail 
firm (700+ stores) 
Quit behavior is 
highly sensitive to 
relative-pay concerns 
as demonstrated by 
differential pay 
increases; peer 
comparisons are 
concerned primarily 
with fairness 
 
 
  
`81 
 
Table 0 Panel B: Review of Tournament Theory Research in Economics 
Year Author(s) Title Journal Objective Method / Data Conclusion 
1981 Edward P. 
Lazear and 
Sherwin 
Rosen 
Rank-Order 
Tournaments as 
Optimum Labor 
Contracts 
The Journal 
of Political 
Economy 
To describe 
compensation 
schemes based on 
rank order instead 
of output level 
Analytical 
Models 
Rank-order 
compensation 
generates the same 
allocation as piece 
rate when workers are 
risk-neutral; when 
workers are risk 
adverse, they prefer 
one over the other 
depending on the 
utility function 
1983 Jerry R. Green 
and Nancy L. 
Stokey 
A Comparison of 
Tournaments and 
Contracts 
Journal of 
Political 
Economy 
To compare rank-
order 
compensation to 
individual 
contracts in a 
setting with a risk-
neutral principle 
and risk-adverse 
agents 
Analytical 
Models 
Rank-order 
tournaments allow the 
principle to filter the 
idiosyncratic effect of 
common shocks and 
provides information 
regarding the agents 
output that is 
attributable to effort; 
but, are otherwise less 
efficient than direct 
measurement 
1987 Bull, Schotter 
and Weigelt 
Tournaments and 
Piece Rates: An 
Experimental 
Study 
Journal of 
Political 
Economy 
To examine if 
laboratory 
participants exhibit 
the behavior 
predicted in 
models of rank 
order tournaments 
Experiments 
where 225 
undergraduates 
are paired and 
make cost / effort 
decisions subject 
to a random 
shock 
Mean effort levels for 
both piece-rate and 
rank-order 
tournaments 
converged toward 
expected equilibrium, 
however, rank-order 
schemes produced 
higher effort variance, 
and piece-rate elicited 
higher effort from 
disadvantaged 
participants 
1988 Sudipto 
Bhattacharya 
and J. Luis 
Guasch 
Heterogeneity, 
Tournaments, and 
Hierarchies 
Journal of 
Political 
Economy 
If tournament 
models are more 
efficient and less 
costly to monitor 
than piece-rate, 
why are they no 
seen in practice? 
Analytical 
Models 
Compensation 
schemes differ from 
the modeled 
expectation, they 
commonly exist 
within organizations 
and hierarchies; 
comparisons across 
skill types and 
tournaments are 
necessary for efficient 
outcomes when self-
selection occurs 
1989 Robert Drago 
and John S. 
Heywood 
Tournaments, 
Piece Rates, and 
the Shape of the 
Payoff Function 
The Journal 
of Political 
Economy 
To further explain 
the high variation 
in effort allocation 
identified in Bull 
et. al., 1987 
Replication and 
extension of prior 
experimental 
work utilizing 
different 
incentive 
structures 
Bull et. al., 1987 
report that 
computational 
difficulties within the 
tournament 
experiment explain 
high variance in effort 
allocation; this study 
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finds that the variance 
is explained by 
motivation and 
strategic action in 
relation to incentive 
structure 
1989 Edward P. 
Lazear 
Pay Equality and 
Industrial Politics 
The Journal 
of Political 
Economy 
Does wage 
compression 
increase 
efficiency, or will 
it reduce the 
motivation of 
skilled / high 
performing 
workers? 
Analytical 
models of 
different practical 
employment 
situations 
When outcomes are 
based on relative 
comparisons within 
groups, wage 
compression can 
create efficiency  
1999 Tor Eriksson Executive 
Compensation 
and Tournament 
Theory: 
Empirical Tests 
on Danish Data 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To provide 
observational 
investigation of the 
empirical 
predictions made 
within the 
tournament theory 
literature 
Regression 
analysis of 2600 
executives from 
210 firms over 4 
years 
Provides initial 
evidence that pay 
dispersion within the 
executive structure is 
associated with higher 
levels of performance 
1999 Richard L. 
Fullerton and 
R. Preston 
McAfee 
Auctioning Entry 
into Tournaments 
Journal of 
Political 
Economy 
To describe how 
Auctioning 
entrance into a 
two-player contest 
increases 
efficiency and 
effort allocation 
Analytical 
Models 
Auctioning entrance 
to a two-player 
contest allows 
contestants to sort 
themselves based on 
their private 
knowledge, allowing 
the most qualified to 
enter; after which the 
restricted contest has 
lower monitoring 
costs and higher effort 
allocation 
2001 Michael L. 
Bognanno 
Corporate 
Tournaments 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
Does tournament 
theory practically 
describe the 
current 
employment and 
career 
advancement 
within the 
corporate firm? 
Analysis of 
personal and job 
characteristics for 
25,000 managers 
and executives 
per year from 
1981 to 1988 
A tournament 
environment with 
promotion incentives 
seems to characterize 
the structure of 
corporations; 
however, the high 
predictability of who 
receives the CEO 
promotion based on 
their current pay 
suggest there is no 
tournament, or the 
tournament is already 
concluded at that 
stage. 
2004 Armando 
Levy and 
Tomislav 
Vukina 
The League 
Composition 
Effect in 
Tournaments with 
Heterogeneous 
Players: An 
Empirical 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To investigate the 
differential effect 
of tournament vs. 
piece-rate pay 
when participants 
have different 
ability and 
performance levels 
Analysis of 
broiler chicken 
contracts from 
both piece-rate 
and tournament-
based 
compensation 
schemes  
When participants of 
unequal ability 
participate in multi-
round tournaments 
against the same 
players this creates a 
‘league’ affect, 
altering the 
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Analysis of 
Broiler Contracts 
expectations of the 
players and making 
piece rate more 
efficient  
2010 Carpenter, 
Matthews and 
Schirm 
Tournaments and 
Office Politics: 
Evidence from a 
Real Effort 
Experiment 
The 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
To investigate how 
sabotage behavior 
manifests itself 
within a real effort 
tournament 
Use of a ‘real 
effort’ 
experimental 
tournament with 
student 
participants 
Findings suggest that 
when there is 
ambiguity in the 
assessment of the 
performance of a 
competitor, a worker 
will engage in 
sabotage behavior 
2011 Leuven, 
Oosterbeek,  
Sonnemans, 
and  Van der 
Klaauw 
Incentives versus 
Sorting in 
Tournaments: 
Evidence from a 
Field Experiment 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To investigate the 
degree to which 
self-selection 
explains the 
observed 
performance 
outcomes of 
tournaments with 
different prize 
levels 
Field experiment 
where students 
select into prize 
categories for 
performance 
Self-selection in 
tournaments gives the 
impression of higher 
rewards leading to 
higher performance, 
but controls for 
sorting show there is 
no effect  
2012 Steffen 
Altmann, 
Armin Falk 
and Matthias 
Wibral 
Promotions and 
Incentives: The 
Case of 
Multistage 
Elimination 
Tournaments 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To investigate the 
potential effects of 
promotion on 
effort and 
competitive 
behavior within a 
tournament setting 
Experiments to 
compare behavior 
between a single 
stage and two 
stage elimination-
based tournament 
setting 
Participants exert 
effort beyond the 
amount expected in a 
single stage game in a 
two-stage elimination 
game; findings 
indicate this is likely 
due to forward 
looking behavior 
2015 Delfgaauw, 
Dur, Non, and 
Verbeke 
The Effects of 
Prize Spread and 
Noise in 
Elimination 
Tournaments: A 
Natural Field 
Experiment 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To examine how 
convex variation in 
prize structure and 
‘noise’ based 
uncertainty effects 
performance in a 
multi-stage setting  
Field study 
within a retail 
chain 
implementing a 
two-stage 
elimination 
tournament 
across 208 
locations 
Workers with stable 
levels of performance 
response significantly 
to convex structure 
where workers with 
volatile performance 
do not, second round 
performance improves 
at a cost to first round 
performance 
2015 Marc Gürtler 
and Oliver 
Gürtler 
The Optimality of 
Heterogeneous 
Tournaments 
Journal of 
Labor 
Economics 
To describe the 
information 
benefit derived by 
firms when 
heterogenous 
employees 
compete in a 
tournament setting 
and how this 
incentivizes firms 
to hire 
heterogenous 
employees  
Analytical 
models of the 
outcomes of 
tournaments 
when participants 
are homogenous 
vs. heterogenous 
In a labor market, 
workers have an 
incentive to 
outperform other 
workers and signal 
their quality to firms; 
this scenario 
incentivizes 
heterogenous workers 
to provide higher 
effort   
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Figure 1:Corporate Accounting Wages Since 1972 
Figure 2: Corporate Accounting Wages Since 1972 (Constant 2017 Dollars) 
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Figure 4: Public Accounting Wages Since 1972 
Figure 3: Public Accounting Wages Since 1972 (Constant 2017 Dollars) 
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Figure 6: CFO and Director Earnings Compared to Mean US Earnings by Quintile 
Group 
Figure 5: Comparison of RobertHalf Reported CFO wages and Average CFO 
Wages from ExecuComp 
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Figure 7: Disparity Ratios in corporate and public accounting 
Figure 8: Comparison of Disparity Between Accounting and General Wages 
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Figure 9 Disparity Trends in Accounting and General Wages 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Primary Analysis Sample 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. 
  
Panel B: Public Accounting Wages Descriptive 
Public Accounting 
Wages  
(adj. 2017 Dollars) N Mean 
Std 
Dev Minimum 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile Maximum 
Overall Wages 230 95246 38408 47600 66360 80885 121680 207030 
Director 26 162431 24525 133110 139400 157355 183425 207030 
Manager 46 130517 24995 99303 108573 127781 140920 189120 
Senior 46 86538 12319 69473 76400 82190 97625 109750 
Staff 46 68046 9843 56520 58310 67134 76830 88500 
New hire 46 58296 7672 47600 52203 56059 66125 73500 
 
Panel C: Corporate Accounting Descriptive  
Corporate Wages  
(adj. 2017 Dollars) N Mean 
Std 
Dev Minimum 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile Maximum 
Overall Wages 180 271863 131681 123120 163258 218240 373050 589950 
CFO 42 442747 76440 232320 402480 453003 484380 589950 
Controller 46 287700 115751 182085 203840 221534 334800 573100 
Director 46 210098 71538 140605 160160 170283 238080 390750 
Assist. Cont. 46 161767 36518 123120 131120 152928 172010 262200 
 
  N Mean 
Std 
Dev Minimum 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile Maximum 
CDISP 174149 5.377 0.732 2.870 5.263 5.350 5.882 6.471 
PDISP 174149 2.971 0.157 2.549 2.900 2.976 3.056 3.333 
HDISP 174149 2.018 0.300 1.564 1.675 2.104 2.197 2.587 
ABSDA 174149 0.097 0.135 0.001 0.015 0.046 0.121 0.783 
BIGN 174149 0.791 0.407 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
EARN 174149 -0.010 0.187 -0.921 -0.020 0.037 0.079 0.283 
LEV 174149 0.256 0.228 0.000 0.056 0.224 0.385 1.050 
LOSS 174149 0.298 0.457 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
MKTCAP 174149 4.888 2.160 0.403 3.284 4.726 6.380 10.347 
MTB 174149 1.734 1.328 0.530 0.983 1.281 1.927 8.481 
OCF 174149 0.055 0.155 -0.650 0.017 0.080 0.135 0.363 
SIZE 174149 5.228 1.897 2.313 3.717 4.936 6.484 10.351 
AQ 105823 0.112 0.548 0.001 0.012 0.031 0.063 4.943 
RETURN 88332 0.151 0.627 -0.824 -0.233 0.051 0.377 3.000 
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Panel C: Pearson Correlation Table 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
LEV SIZE EARN OCF LOSS MKTCAP MTB ABS_DA RETURN BIGN HDISP CDISP PDISP AQ 
1 LEV 1 
2 SIZE 0.11 1 
<.0001 
3 EARN -0.11 0.17 1 
<.0001 <.0001 
4 OCF -0.08 0.20 0.72 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
5 LOSS 0.12 -0.19 -0.59 -0.49 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
6 MKTCAP -0.11 0.86 0.15 0.17 -0.22 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
7 MTB -0.08 -0.04 -0.13 -0.11 0.06 0.26 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
8 ABS_DA -0.02 -0.04 -0.25 -0.21 0.14 0.03 0.15 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
9 RETURN -0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.08 -0.09 0.07 0.22 0.02 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
10 BIGN 0.01 0.29 0.06 0.07 -0.06 0.28 0.02 -0.07 0.03 1 
0.0403 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
11 HDISP 0.06 -0.26 0.14 0.12 -0.16 -0.33 -0.12 -0.20 0.03 0.17 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
12 CDISP -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.29 1 
<.0001 0.3886 <.0001 <.0001 0.0028 0.1080 <.0001 <.0001 0.4984 <.0001 <.0001 
13 ADISP -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.13 0.51 1 
<.0001 0.6274 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9756 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
14 AQ -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.17 0.00 -0.01 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0247 <.0001 <.0001 0.0139 <.0001 <.0001 0.4243 <.0001 
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Table 2: Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting and the Accruals-Cashflow Relationship 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Corporate 
Disparity Ratio 
Public Disparity 
Ratio 
Public to Corp 
Disparity Ratio 
 Corp and Public 
Disparity Ratio 
All Disparity 
Ratios 
AQt AQt AQt AQt 
CDISPt 0.0007 0.0100 0.0493 
2.78 12.15 23.53 
0.0828 <.0001 <.0001 
PDISPt -0.0628 -0.0857 -0.1099 
-12.37 -13.60 -15.98 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
HDISPt -0.3030 -0.3344 
-20.45 -20.63 
<.0001 <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0263 -0.0261 -0.0227 -0.0260 -0.0216 
-9.68 -9.61 -8.62 -9.56 -8.19 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.0487 -0.0494 0.0087 -0.0487 0.0185 
-2.59 -2.63 0.46 -2.59 0.96 
0.0095 0.0085 0.6489 0.0096 0.3354 
MTBt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
0.42 0.44 0.30 0.44 0.29 
0.6722 0.6594 0.7653 0.6581 0.7729 
LEVt 0.0159 0.0157 0.0170 0.0158 0.0177 
2.73 2.67 3.34 2.69 3.49 
0.0063 0.0075 0.0008 0.0072 0.0005 
BIGNt 0.0264 0.0264 0.0047 0.0263 0.0017 
11.08 11.10 2.07 11.04 0.74 
<.0001 <.0001 0.0385 <.0001 0.4595 
MKTCAPt 0.0743 0.0730 0.0288 0.0726 0.0222 
10.47 10.27 4.24 10.21 3.25 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0012 
LOSSt -0.1086 -0.1112 -0.1086 -0.1086 -0.0341 
-8.71 -8.71 -8.71 -8.71 -2.86 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0043 
Intercept 0.1870 0.3786 -0.3030 0.3941 0.9690 
12.82 15.00 -20.45 15.20 22.47 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 105878 105878 105878 105878 105878 
No. of clusters 9999 9999 9999 9999 9999 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.013 0.035 0.013 0.038 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include 
year fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
Table 3: Lagged Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting and the Accruals-Cashflow 
Relationship 
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Table 3: Lagged Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting and the Accruals-Cashflow 
Relationship 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Corporate 
Disparity Ratio 
Public Disparity 
Ratio 
Public to Corp 
Disparity Ratio 
 Corp and Public 
Disparity Ratio 
All Disparity 
Ratios 
AQt AQt AQt AQt 
CDISPt-1 -0.0030 0.0114 0.0496 
-5.31 14.93 22.58 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
PDISPt-1 -0.1049 -0.1323 -0.1407 
-19.99 -21.06 -20.49 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
HDISPt-1 -0.3050 -0.3350 
-20.31 -20.31 
<.0001 <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0264 -0.0262 -0.0224 -0.0261 -0.0218 
-9.67 -9.58 -8.45 -9.58 -8.22 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.0489 -0.0499 0.0093 -0.0495 0.0166 
-2.59 -2.64 0.48 -2.62 0.86 
0.0096 0.0082 0.6282 0.0088 0.3902 
MTBt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
0.42 0.44 0.31 0.44 0.28 
0.6732 0.6586 0.7601 0.6604 0.7818 
LEVt 0.0159 0.0156 0.0173 0.0157 0.0178 
2.74 2.66 3.36 2.69 3.51 
0.0062 0.0078 0.0008 0.0073 0.0005 
BIGNt 0.0265 0.0265 0.0044 0.0265 0.0023 
11.08 11.08 1.95 11.09 0.98 
<.0001 <.0001 0.0507 <.0001 0.3253 
MKTCAPt 0.0744 0.0718 0.0307 0.0712 0.0232 
10.44 10.07 4.51 9.98 3.39 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0007 
LOSSt -0.1088 -0.1127 -0.1086 -0.1086 -0.0360 
-8.70 -8.92 -8.71 -8.71 -3.01 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0026 
Intercept 0.2071 0.5047 -0.3050 0.5259 1.0655 
14.06 19.24 -20.31 19.50 23.09 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 105610 105610 105610 105610 105610 
No. of clusters 9996 9996 9996 9996 9996 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.014 0.035 0.014 0.038 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include 
year fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
Table 4: Economy Wide Pay Disparity and the Accruals-Cashflow Relationship 
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 (A) (B) (C) 
 GINI Coefficient 95th to 50th Percentile 90th to 10th Percentile 
 AQt AQt AQt 
GINIt 2.3475   
 23.44   
 <.0001   
95/50t  0.1923  
 
 22.38  
 
 <.0001  
90/10t   0.0503 
 
  20.06 
 
  <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0219 -0.0226 -0.0237 
 -8.28 -8.54 -8.92 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.0051 -0.0063 -0.0123 
 
-0.27 -0.33 -0.65 
 0.7887 0.7408 0.517 
MTBt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
0.33 0.31 0.32 
 
0.7437 0.7548 0.7482 
LEVt 0.0168 0.0168 0.0165 
 
3.04 3.04 2.95 
 0.0024 0.0024 0.0032 
BIGNt 0.0108 0.0112 0.0134 
 4.60 4.77 5.70 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MKTCAPt 0.0433 0.0436 0.0493 
 6.16 6.18 6.98 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt -0.0712 -0.0689 -0.0704 
 
-5.87 -5.65 -5.71 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Intercept -0.8314 -0.4277 -0.3197 
 
-20.13 -15.82 -12.31 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered SE YES YES YES 
 
   
No. of Obs. 105878 105878 105878 
No. of clusters 9999 9999 9999 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.021 0.019 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
Table 5: Corporate and Public Accounting to Overall Wages and the Accruals-Cashflow 
Relationship 
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 (A) (B) (C)  (D) (E) (F) 
 Corporate Accounting Wages  Public Accounting Wages 
 AQt AQt AQt  AQt AQt AQt 
Corp/10t 0.0068   Public/10t 0.0193   
 20.33    19.10   
 <.0001    <.0001   
Corp/50t  0.0309  Public/50t  0.0917  
 
 21.00    19.44  
 
 <.0001    <.0001  
Corp/95t   0.1348 Public/95t   0.4233 
 
  21.14    19.37 
 
  <.0001    <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0239 -0.0237 -0.0237  -0.0246 -0.0244 -0.0244 
 -9.00 -8.91 -8.92  -9.28 -9.20 -9.22 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.0116 -0.0099 -0.0114  -0.0042 -0.0002 0.0025 
 
-0.61 -0.52 -0.60  -0.22 -0.01 0.13 
 0.5438 0.6015 0.549  0.8274 0.9904 0.896 
MTBt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
0.30 0.30 0.31  0.26 0.25 0.24 
 
0.7635 0.7634 0.7566  0.7973 0.8044 0.8108 
LEVt 0.0170 0.0171 0.0172  0.0170 0.0172 0.0173 
 
3.07 3.11 3.13  3.17 3.25 3.33 
 0.0022 0.0019 0.0018  0.0015 0.0012 0.0009 
BIGNt 0.0138 0.0132 0.0138  0.0111 0.0096 0.0086 
 5.91 5.69 5.96  4.84 4.22 3.78 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 
MKTCAPt 0.0507 0.0493 0.0508  0.0451 0.0420 0.0399 
 7.22 7.05 7.28  6.53 6.10 5.82 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt -0.0708 -0.0703 -0.0724  -0.0534 -0.0490 -0.0436 
 
-5.76 -5.75 -5.94  -4.38 -4.04 -3.61 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 
Intercept 0.0728 0.0575 0.0140  0.0752 0.0553 0.0018 
 
5.25 4.15 0.98  5.43 3.97 0.12 
 <.0001 <.0001 0.3260  <.0001 <.0001 0.9053 
     
   
Industry FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Firm 
Clustered 
SE 
YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
 
    
   
No. of Obs. 105878 105878 105878  105878 105878 105878 
No. of 
clusters 9999 9999 9999  9999 9999 9999 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.020 0.021  0.024 0.026 0.028 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 6: Corporate and Public Accounting to Overall Wages and the Accruals-Cashflow 
Relationship 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 CFO to 10th Percentile CFO to 10th Percentile CFO to 10th Percentile 
 AQt AQt AQt 
Corp/10t -0.0062   
 -10.54   
 <.0001   
Public/10t 0.0321   
 15.23   
 <.0001   
Corp/50t  -0.0245  
 
 -10.62  
 
 <.0001  
Public/50t  0.1420  
  15.72  
  <.0001  
Corp/95t   -0.0709 
   -10.16 
   <.0001 
Public/95t   0.5566 
   16.60 
   <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0257 -0.0254 -0.0252 
 -9.58 -9.49 -9.44 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.0087 -0.0044 -0.0010 
 -0.46 -0.23 -0.05 
 0.6479 0.8194 0.9584 
MTBt 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 0.26 0.25 0.24 
 0.7930 0.8007 0.8066 
LEVt 0.0168 0.0170 0.0171 
 3.15 3.22 3.30 
 0.0017 0.0013 0.001 
BIGNt 0.0125 0.0109 0.0096 
 5.36 4.71 4.18 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MKTCAPt 0.0474 0.0441 0.0414 
 6.80 6.35 6.01 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt -0.0515 -0.0466 -0.0422 
 -4.23 -3.85 -3.49 
 <.0001 0.0001 0.0005 
Intercept 0.1068 0.0867 0.0351 
 7.76 6.36 2.53 
 <.0001 <.0001 0.0115 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered SE YES YES YES 
 
   
No. of Obs. 105878 105878 105878 
No. of clusters 9999 9999 9999 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.026 0.028 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. 
All tests are otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all 
models. All models include year fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
  
`96 
 
Table 7: CFO Specific Pay Disparity and the Accruals-Cashflow Relationship 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 CFO to 10th Percentile CFO to 10th Percentile CFO to 10th Percentile 
 AQt AQt AQt 
CFO/10t -1.1787   
 -2.26   
 0.0240   
CFO/50t  -4.5152  
 
 -2.27  
 
 0.0234  
CFO/95t   -14.1928 
 
  -2.25 
 
  0.0248 
SIZEt -0.0942 -0.0949 -0.0962 
 -5.23 -5.29 -5.37 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt 0.0559 0.0585 0.0620 
 
0.50 0.53 0.56 
 0.6143 0.598 0.577 
MTBt -0.0578 -0.0579 -0.0581 
 
-5.64 -5.65 -5.67 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LEVt -0.1790 -0.1793 -0.1793 
 
-2.61 -2.61 -2.61 
 0.0092 0.0092 0.0092 
BIGNt 0.0436 0.0433 0.0431 
 2.94 2.92 2.91 
 
0.0033 0.0035 0.0037 
MKTCAPt 0.1499 0.1497 0.1494 
 4.11 4.10 4.09 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt 0.0703 0.0710 0.0720 
 
1.14 1.15 1.16 
 0.2563 0.2517 0.2455 
Intercept 0.7341 0.7374 0.7420 
 
8.06 8.10 8.15 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered SE YES YES YES 
 
   
No. of Obs. 15049 15049 15049 
No. of clusters 1755 1755 1755 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.022 0.022 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All 
tests are otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. 
All models include year fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 8: Discretionary Accruals and Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
 
Corporate 
Disparity Ratio  
Public Disparity 
Ratio 
Public-to-Corp 
Disparity Ratio 
Corp & Public 
Disparity Ratio 
All Disparity 
Ratios 
 ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt 
CDISPt 0.0069   0.0109 0.0301 
 12.48   14.75 35.34 
 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 
PDISPt  -0.0101  -0.0363 -0.0479 
 
 -3.13  -8.81 -12.67 
 
 0.0018  <.0001 <.0001 
HDISPt   -0.1300  -0.1541 
 
  -36.44  -38.02 
 
  <.0001  <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0219 -0.0218 -0.0220 -0.0216 -0.0218 
 -16.63 -16.36 -17.38 -16.25 -17.16 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.1901 -0.1912 -0.1741 -0.1895 -0.1663 
 
-5.11 -5.13 -4.83 -5.09 -4.66 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MTBt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.82 0.83 0.74 0.83 0.69 
 
0.4134 0.4042 0.4605 0.4053 0.4927 
LEVt -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 
 
-0.65 -0.69 -0.59 -0.67 -0.49 
 0.5129 0.4928 0.5574 0.5010 0.6235 
MKTCAPt 0.0260 0.0259 0.0176 0.0258 0.0160 
 22.89 22.63 16.51 22.58 15.09 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt 0.0363 0.0358 0.0176 0.0352 0.0133 
 7.64 7.46 4.02 7.35 3.06 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0022 
BIGNt -0.0457 -0.0460 -0.0176 -0.0477 -0.0160 
 -17.69 -17.97 -7.52 -18.75 -6.85 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROAt-1 -0.0515 -0.0516 -0.0500 -0.0516 -0.0495 
 -1.15 -1.15 -1.14 -1.15 -1.14 
 
0.2509 0.2507 0.2530 0.2509 0.2542 
Intercept 0.0899 0.1576 0.4136 0.1779 0.4489 
 
19.88 18.13 38.01 19.26 47.65 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
     
 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES YES YES YES YES 
     
 
No. of Obs. 174134 174134 174134 174134 174134 
No. of clusters 16428 16428 16428 16428 16428 
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.073 0.091 0.074 0.096 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 9: Discretionary Accruals and Lagged Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
 
Corporate 
Disparity Ratio  
Public 
Disparity Ratio 
Public-to-Corp 
Disparity Ratio 
Corp & Public 
Disparity Ratio 
All Disparity 
Ratios 
 ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt 
CDISPt-1 0.0048   0.0105 0.0288 
 10.60   16.69 40.11 
 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 
PDISPt-1  -0.0259  -0.0516 -0.0573 
 
 -11.11  -16.38 -19.84 
 
 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
HDISPt-1   -0.1291  -0.1511 
 
  -49.01  -50.81 
 
  <.0001  <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0158 -0.0156 -0.0157 -0.0155 -0.0155 
 -16.01 -15.72 -16.89 -15.65 -16.77 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.1590 -0.1595 -0.1400 -0.1586 -0.1340 
 -8.52 -8.52 -7.93 -8.51 -7.77 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MTBt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.67 0.72 0.34 0.71 0.14 
 0.5037 0.4737 0.7311 0.4798 0.8907 
LEVt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
 -0.02 -0.11 0.38 -0.07 0.68 
 0.9817 0.9133 0.7071 0.9463 0.4989 
MKTCAPt 0.0198 0.0196 0.0117 0.0195 0.0103 
 23.68 23.36 14.50 23.32 12.70 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt 0.0332 0.0322 0.0163 0.0314 0.0117 
 11.52 11.12 6.00 10.91 4.39 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
BIGNt -0.0440 -0.0452 -0.0162 -0.0466 -0.0148 
 -19.88 -20.39 -8.08 -21.08 -7.41 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROAt-1 -0.0139 -0.0140 -0.0124 -0.0138 -0.0117 
 -0.59 -0.60 -0.56 -0.59 -0.54 
 0.5523 0.5509 0.5750 0.5541 0.5897 
Intercept 0.0915 0.1955 0.4000 0.2164 0.4663 
 24.95 26.30 54.52 27.37 55.27 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
      
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES 
      
No. of Obs. 159174 159174 159174 159174 159174 
No. of clusters 15403 15403 15403 15403 15403 
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.065 0.098 0.066 0.108 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are otherwise two 
tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year fixed effects, and firm 
clustered standard errors 
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Table 10: Discretionary Accruals and Economy Wide Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public 
Accounting 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 GINI Coefficient 95th to 50th Percentile 90th to 10th Percentile 
 ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt 
GINIt 1.9174   
 47.19   
 <.0001   
95/50t  0.1633  
 
 44.99  
 
 <.0001  
90/10t   0.0475 
 
  41.39 
 
  <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0190 -0.0195 -0.0204 
 -15.49 -15.91 -16.50 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.1574 -0.1581 -0.1621 
 -4.44 -4.48 -4.57 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MTBt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.73 0.70 0.65 
 0.4660 0.4865 0.5145 
LEVt -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 -0.51 -0.48 -0.46 
 0.6110 0.6286 0.6462 
MKTCAPt 0.0124 0.0122 0.0134 
 11.84 11.84 12.89 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt 0.0058 0.0046 0.0085 
 1.38 1.10 2.00 
 0.1681 0.2725 0.0454 
BIGNt -0.0293 -0.0278 -0.0232 
 -12.39 -11.92 -10.14 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROAt-1 -0.0493 -0.0491 -0.0495 
 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 
 0.2538 0.2538 0.2523 
Intercept -0.6806 -0.3684 -0.3282 
 -46.00 -41.51 -35.96 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered SE YES YES YES 
    
No. of Obs. 174162 174162 174162 
No. of clusters 16429 16429 16429 
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.106 0.103 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All 
tests are otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. 
All models include year fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 11: Discretionary Accruals and Corporate and Public Accounting to Overall Wages 
 (A) (B) (C)  (E) (F) (G) 
 Corporate Accounting Wages  Public Accounting Wages 
 ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt  ABSDAt   
Corp/10t 0.0063   Public/10t 0.0139   
 41.10    36.46   
 <.0001    <.0001   
Corp/50t  0.0270  Public/50t  0.0614  
 
 41.97    37.18  
 
 <.0001    <.0001  
Corp/95t   0.1098 Public/95t   0.2538 
 
  42.20    36.66 
 
  <.0001    <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0208 -0.0205 -0.0204  -0.0223 -0.0221 -0.0222 
 -16.81 -16.66 -16.51  -17.74 -17.69 -17.70 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.1598 -0.1599 -0.1622  -0.1657 -0.1650 -0.1666 
 
-4.53 -4.53 -4.57  -4.67 -4.66 -4.70 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MTBt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.62 0.65 0.68  0.60 0.61 0.63 
 
0.5333 0.5171 0.4995  0.5480 0.5405 0.5303 
LEVt -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
-0.38 -0.39 -0.42  -0.40 -0.41 -0.42 
 0.7075 0.6934 0.6762  0.6905 0.6849 0.6725 
MKTCAPt 0.0141 0.0142 0.0152  0.0155 0.0152 0.0157 
 13.76 13.83 14.69  15.05 14.78 15.15 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt 0.0099 0.0098 0.0120  0.0127 0.0118 0.0127 
 2.34 2.31 2.82  2.99 2.78 2.98 
 
0.0194 0.0207 0.0047  0.0028 0.0054 0.0029 
BIGNt -0.0257 -0.0277 -0.0317  -0.0191 -0.0194 -0.0206 
 -11.11 -11.89 -13.45  -8.45 -8.58 -9.08 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROAt-1 -0.0492 -0.0492 -0.0494  -0.0494 -0.0493 -0.0494 
 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14  -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 
 
0.2532 0.2535 0.2534  0.2527 0.2530 0.2531 
Intercept 0.0437 0.0375 0.0093  0.0670 0.0604 0.0378 
 
13.11 11.44 2.88  19.13 17.58 11.28 
 <.0001 <.0001 0.0039  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
     
   
Industry FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
     
   
No. of Obs. 174162 174162 174162  174162 174162 174162 
No. of clusters 16429 16429 16429  16429 16429 16429 
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.103 0.100  0.100 0.101 0.099 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 12: Corporate and Public to Economy Wide Pay Disparity and the Accruals-Cashflow Relationship 
(A) (B) (C) 
CFO to 10th Percentile CFO to 10th Percentile CFO to 10th Percentile 
ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt 
Corp/10t 0.0053 
26.37 
<.0001 
Public/10t 0.0027 
4.72 
<.0001 
Corp/50t 0.0192 
24.07 
<.0001 
Public/50t 0.0204 
8.54 
<.0001 
Corp/95t 0.0656 
25.02 
<.0001 
Public/95t 0.1227 
14.17 
<.0001 
SIZEt -0.0210 -0.0210 -0.0212
-16.90 -16.91 -16.99
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
OCFt -0.1602 -0.1602 -0.1620
-4.54 -4.54 -4.58
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MTBt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.61 0.63 0.64 
0.5403 0.5314 0.5245 
LEVt -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
-0.37 -0.38 -0.40
0.7108 0.7014 0.6926 
MKTCAPt 0.0141 0.0140 0.0146 
13.73 13.67 14.14 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt 0.0097 0.0093 0.0104 
2.31 2.21 2.46 
0.0208 0.0275 0.0138 
BIGNt -0.0239 -0.0241 -0.0252
-10.63 -10.74 -11.17
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
ROAt-1 -0.0492 -0.0491 -0.0492
-1.14 -1.14 -1.14
0.2532 0.2535 0.2535 
Intercept 0.0460 0.0412 0.0136 
13.63 12.38 4.20 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered SE YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 174162 174162 174162 
No. of clusters 16429 16429 16429 
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.104 0.102 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 13: CFO Specific Pay Disparity and Discretionary Accruals 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 CFO to 10th Percentile CFO to 10th Percentile CFO to 10th Percentile 
 ABSDAt ABSDAt ABSDAt 
CFO/10t 0.2862   
 2.34   
 0.0192   
CFO/50t  1.0808  
 
 2.30  
 
 0.0215  
CFO/95t   3.4668 
 
  2.21 
 
  0.0270 
SIZEt -0.0135 -0.0133 -0.0130 
 -4.24 -4.20 -4.14 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt -0.1700 -0.1707 -0.1713 
 -4.77 -4.79 -4.80 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MTBt 0.0135 0.0135 0.0135 
 5.93 5.94 5.95 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LEVt -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0018 
 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 
 0.8710 0.8752 0.8773 
MKTCAPt 0.0087 0.0088 0.0089 
 3.10 3.13 3.15 
 
0.0019 0.0018 0.0017 
LOSSt -0.0067 -0.0067 -0.0067 
 -1.31 -1.30 -1.29 
 0.1910 0.1938 0.1964 
BIGNt -0.0226 -0.0227 -0.0229 
 -2.82 -2.84 -2.86 
 0.0049 0.0046 0.0043 
ROAt-1 -0.0597 -0.0598 -0.0600 
 -1.90 -1.91 -1.91 
 
0.0570 0.0567 0.0561 
Intercept 0.1710 0.1701 0.1691 
 12.94 12.91 12.87 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
    
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered SE YES YES YES 
    
No. of Obs. 17459 17459 17459 
No. of clusters 1977 1977 1977 
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.037 0.037 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All 
tests are otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. 
All models include year fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 14: Earnings Persistence and Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 Earnings  
Corporate 
Disp. Ratio 
Public Disp. 
Ratio 
Corp.-to-Pub. 
Disp. Ratio 
Corp. & Pub. 
Disp. Ratio 
All Disp. Ratios 
 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 
       
EARNt 0.6571 0.9028 0.7693 0.6401 0.8904 0.9242 
 
44.100 9.010 3.180 7.710 4.010 2.930 
 
<.0001 <.0001 0.0015 <.0001 <.0001 0.0034 
 
      
CDISPt  -0.0009   -0.0071 -0.0110 
 
 -1.610   -10.590 -12.180 
 
 0.1069   <.0001 <.0001 
 
      
EARNt × 
CDISPt  -0.0446   -0.0510 -0.0552 
 
 -2.320   -2.450 -2.510 
 
 0.0204   0.0143 0.0122 
 
      
PDISPt   0.0379  0.0576 0.0587 
 
  10.830  14.170 10.020 
 
  <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
 
      
EARNt × 
PDISPt   -0.0380  0.0152 -0.0102 
 
  -0.460  0.170 -0.090 
 
  0.6425  0.8679 0.9250 
 
      
HDISPt    0.0285  0.0326 
 
   11.690  9.990 
 
   <.0001  <.0001 
 
      
EARNt × 
HDISPt    0.0061  0.0313 
    0.140  0.620 
    0.8895  0.5383 
       
Intercept 0.6571 -0.0044 -0.1214 -0.0667 -0.1418 -0.1907 
 
44.100 -1.540 -11.680 -13.500 -13.690 -10.280 
 <.0001 0.1242 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
      
 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
No. of Obs. 157970 157970 157970 157970 157970 157970 
No. of clusters 15203 15203 15203 15203 15203 15203 
Adjusted R2 0.324 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.326 0.327 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 15: Lagged Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting and Earnings Persistence 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 Earnings  
Corporate 
Disp. Ratio 
Public Disp. 
Ratio 
Corp.-to-Pub. 
Disp. Ratio 
Corp. & Pub. 
Disp. Ratio 
All Disp. Ratios 
 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 
       
EARNt 0.6571 0.9828 0.1315 0.7335 0.2617 0.2607 
 
44.100 9.000 0.400 8.020 0.870 0.680 
 
<.0001 <.0001 0.6872 <.0001 0.3819 0.4996 
 
      
CDISPt-1  -0.0001   -0.0062 -0.0093 
 
 -0.230   -9.410 -10.780 
 
 0.8184   <.0001 <.0001 
 
      
EARNt × 
CDISPt-1  -0.0582   -0.0734 0.2548 
 
 -2.730   -3.040 1.810 
 
 0.0064   0.0024 0.0704 
 
      
PDISPt-1   0.0293  0.0474 -0.0795 
 
  6.760  10.160 -3.210 
 
  <.0001  <.0001 0.0013 
 
      
EARNt × 
PDISPt-1   0.1789  0.2709 0.0285 
 
  1.650  2.150 9.390 
 
  0.0987  0.0316 <.0001 
 
      
HDISPt-1    0.0294  0.0456 
 
   11.800  7.130 
 
   <.0001  <.0001 
 
      
EARNt × 
HDISPt-1    -0.0402  0.0402 
    -0.820  0.800 
    0.4110  0.4226 
       
Intercept 0.6571 -0.0066 -0.0943 -0.0666 -0.1149 -0.1513 
 
44.100 -2.290 -7.320 -13.270 -9.210 -7.440 
 <.0001 0.0220 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
      
 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
No. of Obs. 144153 144153 144153 144153 144153 144153 
No. of clusters 13952 13952 13952 13952 13952 13952 
Adjusted R2 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.319 0.320 0.318 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 16: Earnings Persistence and Economy Wide Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting 
 (A)   (B)  (C)  
 
GINI 
Coefficient 
 
95th to 50th 
Percentile 
 
90th to 10th 
Percentile 
 
 EARNt+1  EARNt+1  EARNt+1  
       
EARNt 1.1747 EARNt 0.9795 EARNt 0.8193 
 
 
5.910 
 
7.420 
 
5.740 
 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GINIt -0.4299 95/50t -0.0356 90/10t -0.0103 
 
 
-15.950 
 
-15.250 
 
-14.400 
 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EARNt × 
GINIt -1.1424 
EARNt × 
95/50t -0.0941 
EARNt × 
90/10t -0.0154 
 
 
-2.600 
 
-2.460 
 
-1.200 
 
 
0.0094 
 
0.0139 
 
0.2292 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0.1809 Intercept 0.1080 Intercept 0.0980 
 
 
15.110  13.860  12.940 
 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
 
     
  
Industry FE YES  YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES  YES  YES 
 
      
 
No. of Obs. 157970  157970  157970 
 
No. of clusters 15203  15203  15203 
 
Adjusted R2 0.327  0.327  0.326 
 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 17: Earnings Persistence and Corporate Wages to Overall Wages 
(A) (B) (C) (E) (F) (G)
Corporate Accounting Wages Public Accounting Wages 
EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 EARNt+1 
EARNt 0.7265 0.7462 0.7772 EARNt 0.6741 0.6786 0.6803 
20.010 21.240 19.370 19.470 18.990 16.430 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
C/10t -0.0013 P/10t -0.0027 
-14.870 -13.530 
<.0001 <.0001 
EARNt *C/10t -0.0031 EARNt *P/10t -0.0026 
-2.160 -0.780 
0.0306 0.4363 
C/50t -0.0056 P/50t -0.0121
-15.190 -13.560
<.0001 <.0001 
EARNt *C/50t -0.0162 EARNt *P/50t -0.0131
-2.690 -0.890 
0.0072 0.3719 
C/95t -0.0232 P/95t -0.0497 
-15.260 -13.220 
<.0001 <.0001 
EARNt *C/95t -0.0757 EARNt *P/95t -0.0491 
-2.980 -0.790 
0.0029 0.4321 
Intercept 0.0161 0.0173 0.0229 0.0097 0.0113 0.0154 
8.900 9.470 10.730 6.510 7.040 8.020 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 157970 157970 157970 157970 157970 157970 
No. of clusters 15203 15203 15203 15203 15203 15203 
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.327 0.327 0.326 0.326 0.326 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 18: Earnings Persistence and Corporate and Public Accounting Wages to Overall Wages 
 (A)   (B)  (C)  
 
10th Percentile of 
Wages 
 
50th Percentile of 
Wages 
 
95th Percentile 
of Wages 
 
 EARNt+1  EARNt+1  EARNt+1  
       
EARNt 0.9828 EARNt 0.1315 EARNt 0.7335 
 
 
9.000 
 
0.400 
 
8.020 
 
 
<.0001 
 
0.6872 
 
<.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C/10t -0.0001 C/50t 0.0293 C/95t 0.0294 
 
 
-0.230 
 
6.760 
 
11.800 
 
 
0.8184 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EARNt × C/10t -0.0582 EARNt × C/50t 0.1789 EARNt × C/95t -0.0402 
 
 
-2.730 
 
1.650 
 
-0.820 
 
 
0.0064 
 
0.0987 
 
0.4110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P/10t -0.0001 P/50t 0.0293 P/95t 0.0294 
 
 -0.230  6.760  11.800 
 
 0.8184  <.0001  <.0001 
 
      
 
EARNt × P/10t -0.0582 EARNt × P/50t 0.1789 EARNt × P/95t -0.0402 
 
 -2.730  1.650  -0.820 
 
 0.0064  0.0987  0.4110 
 
      
 
Intercept -0.0066 Intercept -0.0943 Intercept -0.0666 
 
 
-2.290  -7.320  -13.270 
 
 0.0220  <.0001  <.0001 
 
      
 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  
Firm Clustered SE YES  YES  YES  
      
 
No. of Obs. 144153  144153  144153 
 
No. of clusters 13952  13952  13952 
 
Adjusted R2 0.318  0.318  0.318 
 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 19: Earnings Persistence and CFO Specific Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting 
 (A)   (B)  (C)  
 
CFO pay to 
10th Percentile 
Pay 
 
CFO pay to 
50th Percentile 
Pay 
 
CFO pay to 
95th Percentile 
Pay 
 
 EARNt+1  EARNt+1  EARNt+1  
       
EARNt 0.5571 EARNt 0.5567 EARNt 0.5556 
 
 
11.900 
 
11.630 
 
11.290 
 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CFO/10t 0.1548 CFO/50t 0.6482 CFO/95t 2.2922 
 
 
2.860 
 
2.840 
 
2.740 
 
 
0.0043 
 
0.0046 
 
0.0061 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EARNt × 
CFO/10t -1.7534 
EARNt × 
CFO/50t -7.3021 
EARNt × 
CFO/95t -26.3549 
 
 
-2.370 
 
-2.340 
 
-2.270 
 
 
0.0180 
 
0.0196 
 
0.0235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 0.0126 Intercept 0.0126 Intercept 0.0128 
 
 
4.560  4.520  4.560 
 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
 
      
 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES  YES  YES 
 
      
 
No. of Obs. 15735  15735  15735 
 
No. of clusters 1887  1887  1887 
 
Adjusted R2 0.255  0.255  0.255 
 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 20: Earnings Response and Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
 Earnings  
Corporate 
Disp. Ratio 
Public Disp. 
Ratio 
Corp.-to-Pub. 
Disp. Ratio 
Corp. & Pub. 
Disp. Ratio 
All Disp. Ratios 
 RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt 
       
EARNt 0.2889 0.3795 0.8344 -0.2626 0.8546 0.0119 
 5.21 2.13 1.21 -1.07 1.31 0.02 
 <.0001 0.0336 0.2249 0.2836 0.1904 0.9846 
CDISPt  0.0017   -0.0024 -0.0187 
 
 0.65   -0.72 -5.36 
 
 0.5138   0.4706 <.0001 
EARNt × 
CDISPt  -0.0163   -0.0150 -0.0777 
 
 -0.59   -0.46 -2.57 
 
 0.5534   0.6489 0.0103 
PDISPt   0.0401  0.0475 0.0487 
 
  2.48  2.46 2.63 
 
  0.0132  0.0138 0.0087 
EARNt × 
PDISPt   -0.1833  -0.1622 0.0174 
 
  -0.77  -0.62 0.08 
 
  0.4417  0.5372 0.9398 
HDISPt    0.1138  0.1309 
 
   10.36  11.10 
 
   <.0001  <.0001 
EARNt × 
HDISPt    0.2916  0.3460 
    2.52  3.14 
    0.0117  0.0017 
SIZEt -0.0667 -0.0666 -0.0672 -0.0679 -0.0671 -0.0674 
 -5.77 -5.77 -5.78 -5.85 -5.79 -5.80 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt 0.1872 0.1868 0.1893 0.1745 0.1883 0.1685 
 4.06 4.05 4.04 3.78 4.00 3.61 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 0.0003 
MTBt 0.0985 0.0985 0.0984 0.0970 0.0984 0.0971 
 9.89 9.90 9.86 9.69 9.87 9.69 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LEVt 0.0531 0.0535 0.0543 0.0514 0.0543 0.0508 
 1.14 1.14 1.16 1.11 1.15 1.09 
 0.2561 0.2539 0.2477 0.2669 0.2482 0.2749 
MKTCAPt 0.0461 0.0460 0.0463 0.0558 0.0462 0.0565 
 4.15 4.14 4.15 4.96 4.15 5.03 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt -0.1046 -0.1042 -0.1030 -0.0841 -0.1026 -0.0785 
 -9.11 -8.88 -9.13 -7.71 -8.91 -7.12 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
BIGNt 0.0633 0.0632 0.0654 0.0425 0.0657 0.0416 
 8.95 8.94 9.14 5.65 9.12 5.47 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Intercept 0.0767 0.0673 -0.0432 -0.1826 -0.0526 -0.2694 
 3.81 2.72 -0.83 -6.28 -1.00 -5.09 
 0.0001 0.0065 0.4076 <.0001 0.3176 <.0001 
       
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
No. of Obs. 88332 88332 88332 88332 88332 88332 
No. of clusters 11759 11759 11759 11759 11759 11759 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.069 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects 
are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 21: Earnings Response and Lagged Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Earnings  
Corporate 
Disp. Ratio 
Public Disp. 
Ratio 
Corp.-to-Pub. 
Disp. Ratio 
Corp. & Pub. 
Disp. Ratio 
All Disp. Ratios 
RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt 
EARNt 0.2889 0.6648 0.8986 -0.6380 0.8638 -1.8199 
5.21 3.40 1.51 -2.30 1.43 -3.49 
<.0001 0.0007 0.1303 0.0213 0.1521 0.0005 
CDISPt-1 0.0524 0.0438 0.0473 
18.86 12.50 12.88 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
EARNt × CDISP t-1 -0.0636 -0.0662 -0.2442 
-2.07 -1.59 -6.84 
0.0384 0.1112 <.0001 
PDISP t-1 0.1960 0.0751 0.0213 
13.82 4.16 1.31 
<.0001 <.0001 0.1892 
EARNt × PDISP t-1 -0.2007 -0.0625 0.6870 
-0.95 -0.23 3.08 
0.3421 0.8166 0.0021 
HDISP t-1 0.0754 0.0102 
7.07 0.89 
<.0001 0.3719 
EARNt × HDISP t-
1 0.4951 0.7758 
3.89 6.67 
0.0001 <.0001 
SIZEt -0.0667 -0.0675 -0.0698 -0.0663 -0.0684 -0.0653 
-5.77 -5.59 -5.76 -5.42 -5.66 -5.35 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt 0.1872 0.1649 0.1654 0.1643 0.1638 0.1531 
4.06 3.43 3.36 3.38 3.30 3.09 
<.0001 0.0006 0.0008 0.0007 0.0010 0.0020 
MTBt 0.0985 0.0960 0.0960 0.0955 0.0958 0.0952 
9.89 9.30 9.24 9.09 9.27 9.11 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LEVt 0.0531 0.0579 0.0559 0.0528 0.0586 0.0657 
1.14 1.20 1.17 1.11 1.21 1.34 
0.2561 0.2304 0.2438 0.2665 0.2256 0.1814 
MKTCAPt 0.0461 0.0458 0.0485 0.0511 0.0468 0.0463 
4.15 3.97 4.17 4.36 4.05 3.97 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt -0.1046 -0.0997 -0.0943 -0.0843 -0.0968 -0.0795 
-9.11 -8.19 -7.95 -7.39 -8.02 -6.92 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
BIGNt 0.0633 0.0621 0.0729 0.0513 0.0659 0.0641 
8.95 8.90 10.24 6.96 9.25 8.59 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Intercept 0.0767 -0.1921 -0.5021 -0.0940 -0.3723 -0.2778 
3.81 -7.56 -10.80 -3.15 -7.76 -5.78 
0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0016 <.0001 <.0001 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs. 88332 85152 85152 85152 85152 85152 
No. of clusters 11759 11311 11311 11311 11311 11311 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.070 0.068 0.069 0.069 0.071 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 22: Earnings Response and Economy Wide Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting 
 (A)   (B)  (C)  
 
GINI 
Coefficient 
 
95th to 50th 
Percentile 
 
90th to 10th 
Percentile 
 
 RETURNt  RETURNt  RETURNt  
       
EARNt 3.9697 EARNt 2.5559 EARNt 1.5273  
 
5.10 
 
5.01 
 
3.01  
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
0.0026  
GINIt 0.1439 95/50t 0.0317 90/10t -0.0073  
 
1.07 
 
2.79 
 
-2.14  
 
0.2851 
 
0.0053 
 
0.0326  
EARNt × 
GINIt -7.9125 
EARNt × 
95/50t -0.6341 
EARNt × 
90/10t -0.1109 
 
 
-4.57 
 
-4.21 
 
-2.31  
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
0.0207  
SIZEt -0.0633  -0.0630  -0.0669  
 -5.33  -5.27  -5.65  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
OCFt 0.1717  0.1804  0.1818  
 3.72  3.90  3.91  
 0.0002  <.0001  <.0001  
MTBt 0.0983  0.0983  0.0975  
 9.72  9.67  9.63  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
LEVt 0.0622  0.0628  0.0577  
 1.30  1.31  1.23  
 0.1938  0.1895  0.2204  
MKTCAPt 0.0438  0.0419  0.0492  
 3.79  3.59  4.25  
 0.0002  0.0003  <.0001  
LOSSt -0.0876  -0.0910  -0.0904  
 -8.19  -8.62  -8.67  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
BIGNt 0.0676 
 
0.0703 
 
0.0636  
 9.30  9.56  8.41  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
Intercept -0.0113 Intercept -0.0461 Intercept 0.1322  
 
-0.17  -1.00  3.03 
 
 0.8639  0.3176  0.0024 
 
     
  
Industry FE YES  YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  
Firm 
Clustered SE 
YES  YES  YES 
 
      
 
No. of Obs. 88332  88332  88332 
 
No. of clusters 11759  11759  11759 
 
Adjusted R2 0.068  0.068  0.067 
 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include 
year fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 23: Earnings Response and Corporate Wages to Overall Wages 
 (A) (B) (C)  (E) (F) (G) 
 Corporate Accounting Wages  Public Accounting Wages 
 RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt  RETURNt RETURNt RETURNt 
EARNt 0.6095 0.6549 0.6842 EARNt 0.4574 0.4744 0.4770 
 5.12 5.57 5.14  5.07 5.04 4.41 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
C/10t -0.0003   P/10t -0.0020   
 -0.63    -2.05   
 0.5287    0.0403   
EARNt *C/10t -0.0125   EARNt *P/10t -0.0186   
 -2.34    -1.62   
 0.0195    0.1051   
C/50t  0.0008  P/50t  -0.0051  
  0.47    -1.21  
 
 0.6414    0.2277  
EARNt *C/50t  -0.0586  EARNt *P/50t  -0.0839  
  -2.73    -1.72  
  0.0064    0.0857  
C/95t   0.0055 P/95t   -0.0211 
 
  0.78    -1.16 
 
  0.4342    0.2479 
EARNt *C/95t   -0.2270 EARNt *P/95t   -0.3066 
 
  -2.66    -1.53 
   0.0079    0.1249 
SIZEt -0.0658 -0.0652 -0.0651  -0.0667 -0.0664 -0.0665 
 -5.59 -5.55 -5.56  -5.71 -5.69 -5.71 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
OCFt 0.1836 0.1837 0.1842  0.1856 0.1861 0.1862 
 3.96 3.97 3.99  4.00 4.01 4.02 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MTBt 0.0980 0.0982 0.0984  0.0979 0.0980 0.0981 
 9.73 9.76 9.79  9.76 9.77 9.79 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LEVt 0.0572 0.0580 0.0575  0.0549 0.0553 0.0549 
 1.21 1.22 1.21  1.17 1.18 1.17 
 0.2256 0.2208 0.2249  0.2416 0.2390 0.2425 
MKTCAPt 0.0464 0.0451 0.0447  0.0481 0.0473 0.0472 
 4.07 3.96 3.94  4.26 4.18 4.19 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSSt -0.0942 -0.0950 -0.0967  -0.0961 -0.0969 -0.0979 
 -9.04 -9.01 -9.04  -9.17 -9.20 -9.22 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
BIGNt 0.0652 0.0664 0.0663  0.0622 0.0636 0.0634 
 8.88 9.13 9.20  8.34 8.56 8.56 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Intercept 0.0672 0.0603 0.0587  0.0773 0.0740 0.0770 
 2.94 2.63 2.49  3.53 3.35 3.40 
 0.0033 0.0086 0.0126  0.0004 0.0008 0.0007 
        
Industry FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
        
No. of Obs. 157970 157970 157970  157970 157970 157970 
No. of clusters 15203 15203 15203  15203 15203 15203 
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.327 0.327  0.326 0.326 0.326 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 24: Earnings Response and Corporate and Public Accounting Wages to Overall Wages 
 (A)   (B)  (C)  
 
10th Percentile 
of Wages 
 
50th Percentile 
of Wages 
 
95th Percentile 
of Wages 
 
 RETURNt  RETURNt  RETURNt  
       
EARNt 0.6914 EARNt 0.7093 EARNt 0.7010  
 
6.96 
 
7.30 
 
6.29  
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001  
C/10t 0.0020 C/50t 0.0091 C/95t 0.0308  
 
2.55 
 
2.90 
 
2.93  
 
0.0109 
 
0.0037 
 
0.0034  
EARNt × C/10t -0.0245 EARNt × C/50t -0.0927 EARNt × C/95t -0.2647  
 
-3.52 
 
-3.33 
 
-2.79  
 
0.0004 
 
0.0009 
 
0.0053  
P/10t -0.0055 P/50t -0.0214 P/95t -0.0720  
 -2.78  -2.59  -2.48  
 0.0055  0.0096  0.0133  
EARNt × P/10t 0.0243 EARNt × P/50t 0.0706 EARNt × P/95t 0.0760  
 1.29  0.88  0.27  
 0.1960  0.3776  0.7900  
SIZEt -0.0645  -0.0642  -0.0647  
 -5.51  -5.49  -5.55  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
OCFt 0.1816  0.1821  0.1840  
 3.89  3.90  3.95  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
MTBt 0.0981  0.0982  0.0983  
 9.76  9.78  9.80  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
LEVt 0.0575  0.0580  0.0570  
 1.22  1.22  1.21  
 0.2235  0.2211  0.2280  
MKTCAPt 0.0458  0.0448  0.0451  
 4.03  3.96  4.00  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
LOSSt -0.0927  -0.0938  -0.0956  
 -8.77  -8.76  -8.86  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
BIGNt 0.0619  0.0629  0.0628  
 8.29  8.45  8.45  
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
Intercept 0.0597 Intercept 0.0552 Intercept 0.0569  
 
2.66  2.46  2.47  
 0.0078  0.0140  0.0137  
       
Industry FE YES  YES  YES  
Year FE YES  YES  YES  
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES  YES  YES 
 
       
No. of Obs. 88332  88332  88332  
No. of clusters 11759  11759  11759  
Adjusted R2 0.067  0.067  0.067  
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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Table 25: Earnings Response and CFO Specific Pay Disparity in Corporate and Public Accounting 
 (A)   (B)  (C) 
 
CFO pay to 10th 
Percentile Pay 
 
CFO pay to 10th 
Percentile Pay 
 
CFO pay to 10th 
Percentile Pay 
 RETURNt  RETURNt  RETURNt 
      
EARNt 0.3123 EARNt 0.3173 EARNt 0.3157 
 
2.25 
 
2.27 
 
2.25 
 
0.0244 
 
0.0234 
 
0.0247 
CFO/10t 0.8150 CFO/50t 3.7065 CFO/95t 13.4021 
 
2.19 
 
2.27 
 
2.26 
 
0.0285 
 
0.0233 
 
0.0242 
EARNt × CFO/10t -2.3443 EARNt × CFO/50t -10.5466 EARNt × CFO/95t -37.7187 
 
-0.79 
 
-0.82 
 
-0.79 
 0.4281 
 
0.4102 
 
0.4319 
SIZEt -0.1036  -0.1043  -0.1044 
 -5.51  -5.54  -5.54 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
OCFt 0.1819  0.1812  0.1798 
 1.66  1.66  1.64 
 0.0968  0.0980  0.1005 
MTBt 0.0110  0.0109  0.0109 
 1.03  1.02  1.02 
 0.3047  0.3079  0.3095 
LEVt 0.1371  0.1376  0.1380 
 2.75  2.76  2.76 
 0.0060  0.0059  0.0058 
MKTCAPt 0.0920  0.0923  0.0925 
 5.07  5.08  5.09 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
LOSSt 0.0571  0.0569  0.0570 
 1.78  1.77  1.78 
 0.0754  0.0761  0.0755 
BIGNt 0.0195 
 
0.0196 
 
0.0195 
 0.95  0.95  0.94 
 0.3438  0.3408  0.3453 
Intercept 0.1054 Intercept 0.1065 Intercept 0.1058 
 
2.74  2.77  2.75 
 0.0062  0.0057  0.0059 
      
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES  YES 
Firm Clustered 
SE 
YES  YES  YES 
      
No. of Obs. 10677  10677  10677 
No. of clusters 1728  1728  1728 
Adjusted R2 0.021  0.021  0.021 
For variable definitions, see Appendix A. *, **, *** Denote significance at p, 0.10, 0.05, and, 0.01, respectively. All tests are 
otherwise two tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are included at the two-digit SIC code level in all models. All models include year 
fixed effects, and firm clustered standard errors 
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APPENDIX A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
CDISP = 
The ratio of the highest pay level within corporate accounting scaled by the lowest pay 
level reported within corporate accounting reported by the ‘RobertHalf Accounting and 
Finance Salary Guide’ in year t; 
PDISP = 
The ratio of the highest pay level within public accounting scaled by the lowest pay level 
reported within corporate accounting reported by the ‘RobertHalf Accounting and Finance 
Salary Guide’ in year t; 
HDISP = 
The ratio of the midpoint between the highest and lowest pay levels within corporate 
accounting scaled by the midpoint between the highest and lowest pay levels within public 
accounting reported by the ‘RobertHalf Accounting and Finance Salary Guide’ in year t; 
ABSDA = 
The residual from the standard Jones 1991 discretionary accrual model including current 
return on assets to adjust for performance effects on accruals behavior in year t; 
BIGN = An indicator variable equal 1 if the firm’s auditor was a Big N auditor in year t; 
EARN = Income before extraordinary items scaled by the average total assets in year t; 
LEV = (long-term debt (DLTT) + short-term debt (DLC) / average total assets in year t; 
LOSS = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reported negative income in year t; 
MKTCAP = 
Market value of equity calculates as the year end share price multiplied by the shares 
outstanding (PRCC_F × SHOUT) in year t; 
MTB = Book value of equity (CEQ) / market value of equity in year t; 
OCF = Firm cashflows scaled by average total assets reported in year t; 
SIZE = The average level of total assets over year t; 
AQ = 
The standard deviation of the residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) regression of 
accruals on cashflows in year t;  
RETURN = The buy and hold return less the value weighted market return in year t; 
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